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ABSTRACT
Lubiani, Gregory Gill. PhD. The University of Memphis. May/2012. FIVE
ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE. Major
Professor: Dr. Albert A. Okunade
This doctoral dissertation consists of five essays in applied microeconomics with
focus on healthcare economics and health services research. The first three are innovative
being the first in the health economics literature to investigate different distinct aspects of
modeling the economic contents of U.S. physical therapy production using the
generalized flexible translog (GTL) dual cost model and iterative seemingly unrelated
regression estimation (ISURE) technique. Using the higher frequency (bi-weekly) panel
dataset, pair-wise input factor relationships of three distinct labor types are examined for
the fast growing industry, which has up to now lacked current economic investigation due
to data paucity. Pair-wise factor relationships (isoquant curvature) were investigated for
three competing conceptual measures of the elasticity of substitution (own- and crossprice, Allen-Uzawa, Morishima, and shadow), as well as scale economies at constant
output. Second, three Pythagorean means (arithmetic, harmonic and geometric) were
investigated for appropriateness as the mean expansion point for the GTL model. Finally,
statistical tests were conducted indicating that pediatric and adult clinics operate with
distinct underlying technologies. The final two essays incorporate health economics and
health services, research in the study of patient care decision, as it relates to Do Not
Resuscitate (DNR) orders, and the impact of the decision on health outcomes. The DNR
papers, using Probit and propensity score research methodologies, are the first to utilize a
large, comprehensive patient discharge dataset to provide insights into the potential
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implications for healthcare policy, patient awareness and care, most notably for the
rapidly aging baby-boomer population.
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DISSERTATION INTRODUCTION
In the five chapters that follow, the fields of Health and Healthcare Economics are
incorporated with Applied Microeconomics examining, separately, the physical therapy
industry and the cause and effect of Do-Not-Resuscitate (DNR) orders. The first three
chapters investigate the economic contents of the U.S. physical therapy production using
generalized translog (GTL) cost models and iterative seemingly unrelated regression
estimation (ISURE) techniques. The final two chapters incorporate both health
economics, as well as health services research, in the study of patient care decision, as it
relates to DNR orders, and the impact of the decision on health outcomes.
The first chapter investigates the technology cost structure in U.S physical therapy
healthcare centers. I exploit formal economic theories with a unique and rich (2008 –
2009) national dataset of the providers to tease out implications for cost minimizing
operational efficiency. The dataset, comprising over 19,000 bi-weekly, site-specific
physical therapy center observations across 28 U.S. states and Occupational Employment
Statistics (OES) data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, includes measures of output,
three types of labor (clinical, support, and non-clinical or administrative staff), and
facilities (capital), among others. I present and discuss findings from the Iterative
Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation (ISURE) system model results. Consisting
of “For-Profit” physical therapy operations, it is therefore reasonable to assume cost
minimization behavior. The generalized translog cost estimates reflect a well-behaved
underlying technology structure. I find that: (1) each input factor demand is downwardly
sloped; (2) pair-wise factor relationships (other than that between clinical therapists and
assistants indicating economic complements) tend toward substitution; (3) factor demand
1

for physical therapists is relatively more inelastic compared to non-clinical administrative
staff; and that (4) diminishing scale economies exist at the 25%, 50%, and 75% output
levels (patient-visits). These findings advance the economic understanding of operations
in an increasingly important and a rapid growth segment of the medical care sector that
has, up to now (due to data paucity), been missing from efficiency analysis in health
economics literature. This work further provides baseline estimates against which to
assess operational efficiencies in physical therapy care following relevant
implementations of the 2010 U.S. health care reforms.
Utilizing the same physical therapy dataset, the core innovation in the second
chapter is the investigation of the operational implications and policy inferences of
alternative translog cost model specifications and estimation strategies that underlie the
computation of pair-wise input factor relationships (substitutes, complements) and scale
efficiencies in U.S. physical therapeutic health care production. The translog
approximation taken at the arithmetic mean, geometric mean, or harmonic mean,
provides inferences on factor-factor relationships that differ in their policy implications.
While these competing mean value concepts have been applied in health care to separate
datasets in time (disparate periods) and space (different locations), our research goal is to
investigate their implications for production technology structures using one rich (higher
frequency) panel dataset. Further, for the first time in the literature investigating the
economic content of the physical therapy production, the output is adjusted to reflect
treatment quality variations across production sites. Using one uniquely rich dataset to
implement combinations of the alternative model specifications and estimation methods
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yields more powerful insights on the sensitivities of the technology structure and policy
inferences in physical therapy care.
With the rapid growth in population ageing, continuing increases in disease
occurrences affecting physical mobility and flexibility (e.g., diabetes and obesity), and
increased medical coverage stemming from recent health reform mandates, more research
is needed on the economics of U.S. physical therapy production at the disaggregated level
(e.g., adult v/s pediatrics). This is because of potential variations in the operational cost,
reimbursement structure and quality-adjusted outcome mandates of the reformed health
care system. Due to variations in service provider regulations at sites across the U. S., the
production technology structure and resource use flexibility implications of adult
compared with pediatric physical therapy care would tend to differ. Consequently, using
a Generalized Translog (GTL) cost model specification, the core innovation of the third
chapter is the investigation of the operational cost structure differences between adult and
pediatric physical therapy based on a quality-adjusted output measure. Results from the
GTL system of cost equations shows that pediatric clinics do, indeed, have a statistically
different operational cost structure compared with adult centers. The respective adult v/s
pediatric factor demand elasticities of pair-wise factor substitutions (own and cross-Price,
Morishima, and Shadow) and scale economies estimates (evaluated at the 25%, 50%, and
75% production levels) also differ, among other technological characteristics. These
results have operational policy implications.
In a separate investigation of potential healthcare policy implications, the final
two chapters examine the cause and effect nature of DNR directives. A DNR form, often
called a living will, is a binding legal document that states that medical resuscitation
3

should not be attempted should the signer of such a form suffer a fatal cardiac or
respiratory arrest. Previous studies have examined characteristics of DNR patients but
they were mostly based on a small sample of patients with an active DNR order. Data
restrictions have severely hampered the progress in empirical research on the personal
characteristics of DNR signers and whether the decision is influenced by the patient’s
medical condition, severity of illness and the surrounding environment. The main
innovation of the fourth chapter is the information on the decision to sign a “do not
resuscitate” form while in the hospital and a host of covariates associated with such a
life-and-death decision available from a rich multi-hospital dataset with a diverse
population of over 500,000 observations. Utilizing patient-level hospital discharge data
for the state of Tennessee, the study presents results on patient characteristics that are
likely to affect the choice to sign such a directive, as well as the strength and nature of
these relationships, through the use of Probit estimation techniques. Among the potential
factors that may influence this fateful decision, I examine patient demographic
characteristics, such as age, gender, and race, patient insurance status and type of
coverage, admitting diagnosis and acuity. Previous research has indicated, to mixed
degrees, that these factors potentially influence advanced directives such as the DNR.
Using a rich patient-discharge dataset, the estimates from the probit model demonstrate
that a patient’s age has a positive and statistically significant effect on the likelihood of
an active DNR order for a patient. Additionally, men are shown to be statistically more
likely than women to possess a standing DNR directive. Significantly, the most
influential factor affecting the choice examined is the insurance coverage status of the
patient. Through these novel insights into patient care, the research portends unique
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awareness for aid in impactful policy and treatment decisions. This carries potential to
promote changes in the approach of patient care to enhance informational exchange
amongst medical care providers and patients.
Exploiting the same inpatient dataset, the fifth and final chapter is the first to
utilize large-sample hospital discharge data to evaluate the impact of such an advanced
directive on patient health outcomes, most notably death. The study evaluates the impact
of this choice on patient health outcomes through propensity score matching techniques.
Matched on the likelihood of possessing an active DNR from patient, hospital, and
socioeconomic characteristics, we are able to evaluate the power the DNR carries on
inpatient outcomes, most notably mortality, length of stay, and total charges as a proxy
for delivery of treatment. Through this research, increased awareness of the cause and
effect nature of the DNR will aid health practitioners in patient care, as well as policy
decisions.

5

Chapter 1: PRODUCTION COST STRUCTURE IN U.S. OUTPATIENT
PHYSICAL THERAPY12
1.1 Introduction
Physical therapy, integrating movement science, pathology, and functional
analysis, is at the core of both the clinical and scientific aspects of occupational
rehabilitation. Physical therapists seek to improve quality of health and life functioning
for patients through the development and maintenance of mobility, flexibility, and motion
range. They are specialists in musculoskeletal treatment, injury prevention education,
restorative exercise, ergonomics, work hardening, functional capacity evaluation, and
pre-work screening (Isernhagen, 1991). The rising need for these health care services is
driven by factors including population ageing, injuries, and diseases. Physical therapy is
also a growth segment of the broader health sector. The workforce includes clinically
trained physical therapists, physical therapy assistants, and office administrators.
Consequently, as in other health system occupations, imbalances in physical therapy
skills mix pose significant health workforce challenges and task shifting is a costminimizing strategic option to raise productive efficiency of care delivery at a given
quality and cost (Fulton, Scheffler, Sparkes, et al., 2011). These issues motivate our
timely analysis of the relevant economic question of how physical therapy providers
could more effectively reorganize their workforce mix and other factor ratios to secure
sustainable competitive advantages in an era of increasingly tight operational budgets
and changing state and federal mandates.

1

This work was completed under the supervision and direction of Dr. Albert A. Okunade.

2

A version of the research presented in this chapter has been accepted for publication in Health Economics.
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Moreover, in light of the newly passed US Health Care reforms, an analysis of
cost structure in physical therapy care centers using the latest available data would
provide baseline estimates against which to compare future operational efficiency
estimates. As human beings age the physical body depreciates and breaks down, the need
for physical and allied therapies tends to rise. The US Department of Labor (2009)
projected some 127 million people over the age of forty-five by 2010. This estimate is
expected to reach 145 million by 2020 and is largely driven by the “Baby Boomer”
population and advances in healthcare leading to greater life expectancy. Physical human
body deterioration from various diseases also raises demand for physical therapy health
care. The Lupus Foundation of America estimates that 1.5 million Americans are
stricken with lupus, and for them physical therapy tends to be very beneficial as regular
exercise is necessary yet often difficult. There are many types of diabetes that also cause
discomfort to the extent that requires physical therapy care. According to the National
Diabetes Information Clearinghouse (NDIC), an estimated 23.6 million people in the US
were stricken with a form of diabetes in 2007. Conditions such as osteoarthritis of the
knee (Fransen, et al. 2001), as well as Parkinson’s disease (Goede, et al. 2001), also
respond to physical therapy as an alternative or complimentary clinical intervention.
Physical therapy has further aided in the treatment of femoral head osteonecrosis in sickle
cell disease (Neumayr, et al. 2006).
Further is the current policy push in the 2010 US National Health Care Laws to
broaden access to health insurance coverage, to be gradually phased until 2014. Some
27% of the US population less than age of 65 lacked health insurance coverage sometime
in 2007 (Chu and Rhoades, 2009). Since physical therapy is linked more to quality of life
7

than life-saving care, magnitudes of financial burden greatly affect the demand for
physical therapy services (Banthin, 2006). Since the recently passed Health Care Law is
expected to provide coverage for nearly all of the currently uninsured, previously
uncovered or narrowly covered health care (e.g., physical therapy) is now more likely to
be covered when clinically appropriate physiological needs are documented. The
demand for implantable medical devices has also continued to gain significant growth,
and is expected to rise by 9.3% annually through at least 2011. Many physical therapy
procedures and services could complement or substitute for implantable medical devices,
e.g., as a conservative technology for treating degenerative spinal diseases before surgical
intervention. Similarly, by 2020, the disabled elderly population is expected to grow
significantly and raise per-capita Medicare costs (Bhattacharya, 2004). Motor vehicle
accidents also have implications for the rise in physical therapy care. For example, the
US National Center for Statistics and Analysis (NHTSA) estimated that over 2.3 million
Americans were injured in automobile accidents in 2008, and in 2004 there were roughly
65,000 firearm injuries, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The
compounded effects of these multiple forces, in conjunction with the policy mandates on
Comparative Effectiveness Research (CER) integral to 2009 American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act (ARRA), together portend immense potentials for rapid demand
growth in physical therapy health activities 3.

The 22% expected growth in the number

of physical therapists over the next decade is unlikely to keep pace with the new demand
for care. With a continuous push for efficiency and the projected rise in the demand for
3

Specific other treatment technologies compete with or complement physical therapy care for particular
clinical indications [See (Miller, 2007; Ruiz, Guest, Lehman et al., 2005)]. Therefore, physical therapy
providers need to be more cost effective to compete successfully with other treatment technologies
including surgical interventions and pharmacotherapy.
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physical therapy care, it is essential for providers to consistently strive for higher
productivity in light of the comparative effectiveness mandate.4
Currently, there is very little and mostly outdated research to aid in this process
for the physical therapy industry providers. This paper allows for operational cost
efficiency shift differentials using a very recent dataset from a leading national healthcare
provider operating physical therapy centers across the major US states. Our rich panel
data of providers also allows insights into the scope for pair-wise factor substitutions (i.e.,
production isoquant shapes) at constant output and economies of scale using a dual cost
model specification subject to the output constraint. Consequently, the goal of this study
is to provide a useful framework from which physical therapy center administrators and
directors can make economically sound resource use adjustments and operational policy
shift decisions.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews pertinent literature.
Section 3 on methods specifies a theoretical cost model for making technological
parameter inferences using systems of equations estimation technique. Section 4
discusses findings and implications, and section 5 presents the concluding summary.

4

Comparative effectiveness research (CER) programs would incentivize care providers (e.g., through the
use of appropriate reimbursement mechanisms) to adopt the least-cost diagnostic or treatment technology,
from among equally effective alternatives, for a given clinical indication, without compromising (input,
process, and outcome) quality. CER, begun less than two years ago, is seeing a stealthy rise. The 2009
ARRA allocated $1.1 billion for CER to the recipients of the fund, namely the National Institutes of Health
(NIH), Agency for Health Care Research and Quality (AHCRQ), and Office of the US Secretary of the US
Health & Human Services (DHHS). The Institute of Medicine (IOM) priority topics for funding programs
are changing since introduction of the CER and innovative plans are emerging on developing plans for a
national CER program. CER is emerging as a necessary component in the implementation of the recently
passed US Health Care Law as the country seeks to cover some 32 million currently uninsured Americans,
improve health care quality, and contain the stealthy rise in national health care cost increases (See, for
details, Sox, 2010).
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2.1 Previous Literature
Past research studied health care inputs as determinants of output in acute stay
hospitals, nursing homes, specialized hospital pharmacies, physician practices, dentistry,
specific other health care sectors, and health systems. However, research specific to
physical therapy provider operational efficiency is both anemic and very dated most
likely due to the paucity of data. One of the few available is a work sampling study
conducted for a single department over a period of six weeks (Domenech, et al. 1983).
The inputs were hours worked by the supervisor, physical therapists, and administrative
personnel. Physical therapy outputs were measured as the percentage of hours worked
towards direct patient care, indirect patient care, and administrative duties. While
demonstrating the distribution of time across various activities, the investigation fell
significantly short of addressing efficient combinations of factor inputs for a given output
level when factor price ratios change. Bohannon (1984) evaluated possible productivity
for a physical therapist based on the highest dollar value production by a single therapist.
This was argued to be what every therapist was capable of producing. Bohannon (1987)
later conducted a retrospective study that included factors of production other than simply
the days a therapist worked. Among the inputs now considered were hours worked by
both clinical and staff employees. Moreover, output measures were expanded to include
patient visits and the procedures performed. Also, the time period studied increased from
the initial 20 days to 30 months to evaluate production assuming increased productivity
as the goal. Pearson product-moment correlations, partial correlations, and linear
regression methods were used to evaluate production for a single department, to reach the
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interesting conclusion that ‘hours charged’ was the most reliable determinant of
productivity.
Efficiency studies of health care operations other than those of the dated physical
therapy are many and more recent, however. Hadley and Zuckerman (1994) evaluated
the role of efficiency measurements in hospital rate setting. If one does not question the
error structure in their methodology, potentially representing quality and amenity
differences, the study has significant implications for optimal healthcare resource
allocation. As competition intensifies, offering quality service and amenities beyond the
demands of the market become increasingly difficult to provide. If cost-minimization is a
tenable assumption, the conclusion should hold in the physical sector as well. Service
providers who decrease profit by offering excess quality are more likely to be
outcompeted, all else equal.
If the absence of fixed cost data, the variable inputs of human capital can be used
for modeling production functions consistent with the cost-minimizing tendencies of
producers (Okunade, 1993). Studies of the effect of inter-professional collaboration on
the rehabilitation of patients in a healthcare setting has shown the potential positive
effects on efficiency from usage of assorted labor types in medical services (Sinclair, et
al. 2009). While the output was defined as quality of care, the Sinclair, et al. (2009)
study conclusions lend themselves to quantitative analysis as well. An more efficient
allocation of labor resources can raise the output level.
Reinhardt (1972) considered possible combinations of inputs to achieve an output
level in physician practice settings across the US regions. Arguing that a shortage in
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physician labor could be aggravated, he defined output as total patient visits and the
inputs included hours worked by the physician and the number of various types of aides.
While using the single-equation OLS estimation method, and admitting flaws in so doing,
he reached the reasonable conclusion that physician productivity could be raised through
the addition of, and delegation of duties to, the aides. In some circumstances, the study
found that productivity could rise by up to 25%. Additionally, the marginal product of
the aides increased until there was a one-to-one ratio of aides per physician, and
decreased until reaching zero.
Jensen and Morrisey (1986) estimated a translog production function in their
study of the role of physicians in hospital production. They find physicians to substitute
for other resources, a reasonable conclusion as the role of all other resources is to aid the
physician in patient care. The marginal product of each labor input was found to be
increasing, while that of physical capital was decreasing. Also, nursing labor was found
to be the most productive input in hospital care production. This finding is insightful
when determining improved resource allocation given that salaries of support staff are
substantially less than those of physicians.
Suraratdecha and Okunade (2006) reached a similar conclusion in their
application of the translog production function to model and assess Thailand health
system efficiency. They find the marginal product of nurses to be positive and significant
and, as in Jensen and Morrissey (1986), almost all of the factors of production were
detected to be pair-wise substitutes. The Suraratdecha-Okunade study, adjusting for
geographic disparities, found significant efficiency differences across regions within the
health system. Okunade (2001), in a translog cost study of technological progress in US
12

hospital pharmacies, show that while little research had been done on integration of
information technology with regards to clinical and administrative systems in hospitals, it
was clear that information technology could increase cost efficiency and spur gains in
productivity. Finally, past related work, e.g., Okunade (1999) on Norwegian dentistry
production cost structure issued a cautionary note for researchers on selecting the
appropriate conceptual measure of an elasticity of substitution. Since physical therapists
must be licensed and their assistants (support staff) may only perform certain tasks
(professional regulations) under the supervising therapist, one operational policy of
interest is assessing the degree of input responsiveness to exogenous factor wage changes
in the labor market for different types of workers in physical therapy care.
3.1 Theoretical Model and Data
3.2 Generalized Translog Model
The generalized translog (GTL) model has wide applications in health care
industry activity analysis. A second-order Taylor series approximation, the model places
no a priori constraints on estimates of scale economies and factor substitutions. The GTL
is helpful for gaining deeper insights into healthcare production cost efficiency
tendencies of the underlying technology structure. Given its Diewert-flexibility, the
translog functional form has become one of the more theoretically sound methodologies
for modeling in healthcare production economics. The Shepherd duality implies a wellbehaved cost function, with exogenous factor prices and outputs, from which inferences
may be made regarding the production technology structure. Factor substitutions have
potential policy implications, as they inform producers of the scope for reorganizing
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input mix ratios to produce a given output at a more efficient rate when input factor
price(s) change.
Physical therapy clinics or centers can reasonably be assumed to act as if they
seek to minimize variable costs for producing an output level (Y) given that input prices
(Wi) are exogenous to the clinic operators while holding fixed the capital capacity (D).
The clinics also employ three types of labor (clinical physical therapists, physical therapy
assistants or support staff and non-clinical or administrative staff), each with different
required skills sets, within a fixed amount of approximate square footage. Since these
various types of labor are acquired in competitive factor markets, their wages
(respectively Wc, Ws, Wn, Wr) are reasonably exogenous to the employing
establishments. Physical therapy care output, defined as patient visits, is also reasonably
assumed as exogenous, conditional upon capacity as with most forms of medical care
production, to the center operator’s decision making because patients are referred for
physical therapy care by other health care providers (e.g., hospitals, nursing homes and
the gate-keeping physicians) and some cash-paying (uninsured) patients self-refer
themselves. Physical therapy output is here measured as number of visits. The national
provider has implemented care process standards to minimize output quality differences
across the centers. Therefore, any quality differentials across the clinics can be assumed
to be random and therefore unexpected to lead to a systematic bias in output quality.
Thus, exogenous input prices and output in physical therapy care are amenable to
econometric modeling using the GTL production cost specification.
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The implied physical therapy cost (ln C) model incorporating four input prices
(Wis) and the output (Y) and allowing for time effects of technology changes and
controls for clinic size, is

(1)

Minimizing cost subject to output Y is differentiated with respect to four inputs c
(clinical), s (support staff), n (non-clinical), and r (rent). Setting
quantities of input with respective wages,

(i = c, s, n, r) as the

, and z as a set of characteristics, non-price

and non-output, affecting the costs of production. The dual cost equation is
(2)

Subject to Y =
Differentiating ln C with respect to Wi (i= physical therapist wages, technician
wages, administrative labor wages, and rental capital expense), that is, applying
Shepherd’s lemma, produces factor share equations,
(3)
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where, the error term,

, reflects the random effects, as well as omitted variables, of the

factor costs that are separate from the original cost equation error term,

. The

following theoretical restrictions for homogeneity are placed on the cost and factor share
equations

(4)

Since the observed data might not be consistent with a constant returns
technology, controls for clinic size and state (location) differentials for technology in
physical therapeutic services production allows for the estimation of short-run economies
of scale (Hanoch, 1975), defined as,
EOSs = 1 – [∂ ln C/ ∂ln Y]

(5)

Operational cost efficiencies in the production of physical therapeutic services are
possible in a number of ways. The cost equations presented thus far have centered
around one output measure the model is well-developed as to allow for the possibility of
cost savings through economies of scale. Analysis of pair-wise factor substitutions and
economies of scale are useful for generating inferences regarding cost efficiencies in
physical therapy center operations.
3.3 Data and Model Estimation Strategies
This study provides more recent data insights on the nature of cost efficiencies in
the US physical therapy production using a unique and rich panel dataset. The bi-weekly
16

(comparatively higher frequency observations than the norm) operational data are from a
large national provider (in the top 5 of the industry as ranked by annual gross revenues)
operating in 28 US states with multiple centers per state.5 The data set comprises more
than 19,000 data points (total number of bi-weekly observations) spanning 14-month
biweekly periods (April 6, 2008 – April 19, 2008 through July 12, 2009 – July 25,
2009). Physical therapy center output, defined as number of patient visits, is produced
by combining the primary inputs of clinical, support, non-clinical or administrative labor,
and rental capital services. The output is taken as exogenous to the clinic due to
predominance reliance on patient referrals from other health care providers, subject to
capacity. The bi-weekly dataset includes hours worked by each of the respective labor
types (clinical physical therapists, support staff or assistants, and non-clinical
administration) as reported by employees at each site, exogenously determined wage
rates for each labor type, and capital expenditures in the form of rental cost for facilities. 6
Hourly wages of specific labor types are obtained from the Occupational
Employment Statistics (OES) Survey conducted by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics for
the appropriate job classifications for each state, and adjusted to reflect bi-weekly wages
through applying them to the self-reported hours worked at each clinic. The advantage of
this data imputation is that labor wages become exogenously determined in the national
factor market where the physical therapy providers compete with other employers for

5

State-level fixed effects are used to control for presence of potential unobserved quality differences due to
varying professional licensure requirements and regulations across the U.S. states.
6

Space rental expenses for each physical therapy facility, clinic, or center were calculated using the
www.LoopNet.com database. For clinics without rental data for the time period specific to that zip code for
our data coverage, imputation was based on the average for the clinics within the same market area.
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manpower. The exogenously determined labor input wages so derived allowed us to
satisfy the required exogenous factor price conditions for the estimated cost model.
The sum of operational expenses for the four factor inputs is total bi-weekly
operational cost. Moreover, the total cost is normalized using the rental price to focus on
the variable inputs of the production process. Some clinics are large (19.4% of the total)
relative to the average size (defined as clinics employing 4 FTE physical therapists). We
control for the cost shift effects of large v/s regular clinic with a size dummy in the
estimated GTL cost model.7 Our study exploits formal microeconomic theory (dual GTL
cost model) and tested for alternative technology structures in order to investigate scale
economies and pair-wise factor interchange tendencies based on alternative conceptual
measures, and draws policy inferences. Finally, the parent GTL cost and three of the four
factor share cost equations were jointly estimated as an efficient system using the
Iterative Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (ISURE) method. State-specific fixed effects
are included (available but not presented here due to space constraints) in the estimated
model to account for state-level differences in the industry regulatory environments and
other cost impacting unobserved effects.

7

Healthcare facility capacity has been documented in recent literature (e.g., Jencks, et al., 2009) to impact
patient quality of care.
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4.1 EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
4.2 Empirical Model Estimation Results and Evaluation

Table 1. Descriptive statistics of selected, main variables in the cost model

Variable a

Mean

Std. Dev.

Rent ($)

1553.98

1165.93

Physical Therapist expense ($)

5721.11

3924.23

Administrative Staff expense
($)

1145.86

726.88

Technician expense ($)

1047.32

1766.36

Rent Share (% expense)

18.27

10.44

PT Share (% expense)

59.59

14.41

Admin Share (% expense)

13.35

6.41

Technician Share (% expense)

8.80

11.68

Patient Visits (number)
Large Clinics (% total)

198.43
19.4

138.51
39.6

a

These are bi-weekly $mean (or percentage) expenses in a typical physical therapy clinic
cost center. Number of observations is 19,463.

Inferences of production technologies using the cost model estimates are
appropriate, conditional on the requirements that a well-behaved cost function exists.
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Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the main variables used for the TLC
modeling. There exists significant variation in the observed data values. For instance, the
number of visits across observation ranges from 41 to 1,352. Moreover, the bi-weekly
expenditure on physical therapist wages varies from $1,552 to $39,829. The cost is nondecreasing in all factor inputs, and is homogenous of degree 1 in input factor prices. The
negative semi-definite Hessian matrix confirms that the estimated cost model is concave
in factor prices, the cross-price effects are symmetric and the own-price effects are
negative. Consequently, the TL cost function model estimates is consistent with that of a
well-behaved production technology for physical therapy clinics.
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Table 2. ISURE parameter estimates of the generalized translog
variable cost model for physical therapy centers a
Coefficient
Estimate Coefficient Estimate
(S. Error)
(S. Error)
-0.366
Admin0.005
(constant)
(0.006)
Asst
(0.000)
Physical
0.485
Asst-Asst
0.036
Therapist
(0.001)
(0.000)
(P.T.)
Administrative 0.170
Patient
0.017
Staff (Admin) (0.001)
Visits
(0.001)
(Output)
Physical
0.054
Output-0.008
Therapy
(0.000)
Output
(0.001)
Assistant
(Asst)
P.T.-P.T.
0.097
Output0.027
(0.000)
P.T.
(0.000)
P.T.-Admin
-0.056
Output0.008
(0.000)
Admin
(0.000)
P.T.-Asst
-0.040
Output-0.002
(0.000)
Asst
(0.000)
Admin-Admin 0.051
Size
-0.022
(0.000)
(0.000)
a

Number of observations=19,463. System Weighted adjusted
Weighted RMSE = 1.51 (System DF = 56,454).

= 0.95. System

Note: All estimates presented in this paper include controls for state-level fixed-effects
(details can be obtained from the author upon request).

The ISURE (Iterative Seemingly Unrelated Regressions) parameter estimates for
the full translog cost model system are displayed in Table 2. The system-weighted
R2=0.95 (with 56,454 degrees of freedom), and the cost-share equation adjusted R2
estimates (from the second stage regressions) of 0.82 and 0.59 respectively for physical
therapists and administrative staff are statistically significant. These suggest a good
model fit to the observed data field. Moreover, all of the parameter estimates are highly
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statistically significant at α=.01 level or better. This level of significance is not unusual
in well-behaved production cost functions using GTL methodology (See, for example,
Ray (1982); Okunade (1999); Suraratdecha and Okunade (2006)) 8. The first-order factor
price coefficients are all positive and highly significant. Similarly, the positive first order
output coefficient and the negative quadratic output coefficient is negative, together
indicate that costs rise at a decreasing rate under output expansion. The state dummy
coefficient estimates confirm operational costs to vary across the US states (relative to
the base state of AL), which makes practical sense because the US states are
heterogeneous in their professional regulations of physical therapy care and the mandated
ratios of clinical therapists to assistants, among others.

8

A restricted TL cost model suppressing the state-level fixed effects, which produced a system-weighted R2
of 0.8524, was rejected at the 99% confidence level using the appropriate F-test for restricted models.
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Table 3. ISURE estimates of
cost models
Model
A
-0.366
(Constant)
(0.006)

unrestricted (A) v/s restricted (B, C, D, E, F) translog
B
-0.409
(0.006)

C
-0.411
(0.006)

D
-0.122
(0.019)

E
-0.077
(0.024)

F
-0.041
(0.024)

Physical
Therapist (P.T.)

0.485
(0.001)

0.496
(0.001)

0.509
(0.001)

0.352
(0.000)

0.292
(0.002)

0.301
(0.002)

Administrative
Staff (Admin)

0.170
(0.001)

0.177
(0.001)

0.176
(0.001)

0.084
(0. 000)

0.095
(0.001)

0.101
(0.002)

Physical Therapy 0.054
Assistant
(0.000)
(Asst)
P.T.-P.T.
0.097
(0.000)

0.056
(0.000)

0.059
(0.000)

0.043
(0.000)

0.027
(0.001)

0.034
(0.001)

0.110
(0.000)

0.115
(0.000)

P.T.-Admin

-0.056
(0.000)

-0.059
(0. 000)

-0.061
(0. 000)

P.T.-Asst

-0.040
(0.000)

-0.051
(0. 000)

-0.055
(0. 000)

Admin-Admin

0.051
(0.000)

0.051
(0. 000)

0.052
(0. 000)

Admin-Asst

0.005
(0.000)

0.007
(0. 000)

0.009
(0. 000)

Asst-Asst

0.036
(0.000)

0.043
(0. 000)

0.046
(0. 000)

Patient Visits
(Output)

0.017
(0.001)

-0.020
(0.001)

-0.027
(0.001)

0.078
(0.003)

0.50
(0.003)

0.026
(0.003)

Output-Output

-0.008
(0.001)

0.030
(0.001)

0.011
(0.003)

0.124
(0.002)

Output-P.T.

0.027
(0.000)

0.072
(0.001)

Output-Admin

0.008
(0.000)

0.002
(0. 001)

Output-Asst

-0.002
(0.000)

-0.012
(0.000)

System R2

0.9467

0.9404

0.9377
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0.7872

0.7368

0.7202

Table 3 presents estimation results of the unrestricted translog cost function
(Model A) and the restricted models for the testing of homotheticity (Model B),
homogeneity (Model C), and unitary elasticities of substitution (Model D) hypotheses.
Models E and F further impose unitary elasticities of substitution on the restricted
homothetic and homogeneous models. The respective F-test hypothesis results in Table 4
suggest that the operational data of the US physical therapy clinic production are
inconsistent with each of the restricted technology forms. 9 Therefore, our specification
and estimation of the fully-flexible (unconstrained) translog cost (Model A) is the
theoretically sound choice for modeling the observed data.

Table 4. Test statistics for the restrictive homothetic, homogeneous and unitary elasticity of
substitution models
Homotheticity Homogeneity Unitary
Homotheticity Homogeneity
Elasticities
and Unitary
and Unitary
of
Elasticities of Elasticities of
Substitution Substitution
Substitution
Number of
Restriction
s
F-Statistic

2

3

3

5

6

58.50

85.83

1563.41

2314.61

2578.23

9

Similar hypothesis test conclusions can be reached using the likelihood ratio (LR) statistic -2 ln λ = N (ln
|Rc|- ln |Uc|, where N is the number of observations and |Rc| and|Uc| are, respectively absolute values of the
determinants of the restricted and the unrestricted residual covariance matrices. The LR statistic is
asymptotically distributed as a χ2, with the degrees of freedom being the number of independent restrictions
imposed on the full model.
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4.3 Derived Demand and Alternative Conceptual Measures of Pair-wise
Factor Relationships
The estimated full translog cost model that is dual to an implied underlying
production technology enables us to make a number of economic inferences regarding the
characteristics of production structure (Blackorby, Primont and Russell, 2007; Banker,
Conrad, and Stauss, 1986). First is the isoquant shape or degree of isoquant curvature, at
the mean (expansion point) output level. Conceptually, there are alternative measures of
substitution tendencies (e.g., cross-price, Allen-Uzawa, Shadow, Antonelli, Hicks, Pigou,
Hotelling-Lau) in economics (see, for example, Bertoletti, 2009; Cantarelli, 2005; Stern,
2004). These alternative measures rely on different underlying assumptions. Therefore,
their numerical estimates tend to differ and they may classify a given pair-wise factor
relationship differently to the extent that they generate dissimilar policy inferences
(Okunade, 2001). Past econometric work across several industries, including in health
care [see, for example, Suraratdecha and Okunade (2006), Okunade (1999), Okunade
and Suraratdecha (1998), Vita (1990), Reinhardt (1972)] and other markets [see, e.g.,
Boluk and Koc (2010), Kavoi, Hoag, and Pritchett (2009), Stern (2009), Banda and
Verdugo (2007), Ray (1982)] have borne out these tendencies.
Table 5 arrays the own-price and cross-price elasticities of factor demands at the
data means. The negative own-price elasticities are consistent with economic theory.
Demand for physical therapists is shown to be highly inelastic, as expected. Physical
therapy assistants perform some clinical tasks under the direction of supervising
therapists. Consequently, the inelastic demand for assistants arises from their role as
necessary clinical adjunct to the therapists in patient care, and could also be due to their
25

low wages compared with the licensed therapists. The Allen partial elasticities of
substitution, is defined as

(

)

(

)

, and it measures cross-

price elasticity of demand between factors i and j from a cost-share weighted perspective.
Shown in Table 6, it reinforces economic theory with the negatively-signed diagonal
elements, as well as showing the demand for administrative and technician personnel to
be relatively more elastic than that for the clinically imperative physical therapists.
However, the Allen-Uzawa concept is faulty for inferring isoquant curvature if the
production activity entails more than two factor inputs. (See, for details, Okunade
(2001)). The more appropriate Morishima elasticity measure,
(

)

(

)

, is a 2-factor 1-price substitution elasticity concept capturing the

change in factor input ratios as the price of input j varies Finally, the shadow elasticity,
(

)

(

) (

)

, is a 2-factor 2-price substitution

effect at some constant unit cost (Blackorby and Russell, 1989).

Table 5: Own and Cross-price elasticities of factor substitution at mean data values

Physical Therapist
Administrative
P.T. Asst.

Physical Therapist
-0.31544
(0.0005295)
0.15419
(0.0010667)
-0.26631
(0.0036767)

Administrative
0.053908
(0.000373)
-0.52825
(0. 001238)
0.26143
(0.002841)
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P.T. Asst.
-0.029547
(0.0004079)
0.082963
(0.0009016)
-0.28621
(0.0032311)

Table 6: Allen/Uzawa partial elasticities of factor substitution at mean data values

Physical Therapist

Physical Therapist

Administrative

P.T. Asst.

-0.64990
(0.0010919)

0.31768
(0.0000633)

-0.54868
(0.000022)

-3.11291
(0.0072926)

1.54058
(0.000049)
-5.31475
(0.059999)

Administrative
P.T. Asst.

Table 7: Morishima elasticities of pair-wise factor substitution at mean data values

Physical Therapist
Administrative
P.T. Asst.

Physical Therapist
0

Administrative
0.58215

P.T. Asst.
0.25666

0.46964
0.049130

0
0.78967

0.36917
0

Table 8: Shadow elasticity estimates of pair-wise factor substitutions at mean data values

Physical Therapist
Administrative

Physical Therapist

Administrative

P.T. Asst.

0

0.028588

0.009959112

0

0.003551990

P.T. Asst.

0
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The off-diagonal elements in Tables 6, 7, and 8 are the factor substitution
elasticities, alternatively defined. In both the Morishima and shadow estimates, all of the
labor factors are pair-wise substitutes with one notable exception. Physical therapists and
their assistants relate as pair-wise complements; this evidence is supported by the US
practice regulatory environments requiring supervision of technician tasks by the licensed
therapists. As displayed in Table 7 (Morishima elasticity measurements), if the wages of
physical therapists rise 10%, the therapist-assistants ratio will increase by approximately
2.27%. Alternatively, if the wages of assistants rise 10%, the assistants-therapist ratio
increases by only approximately 0.05%. Once again, this has to do with physical
therapist assistants as a relative low wage aid to the physical therapist. There are statespecific constraints on increasing the ratio of assistants to therapists, however, due to
practice licensing requirements and regulations limiting the tasks of assistants in the
absence of a supervising therapist.
Further illustrated, we see that if the wages of physical therapists rise 10%, the
therapist-administrative staff ratio will rise by approximately 5.8%. However, if the
administrative staff wages increase by 10%, the administrative staff-therapist ratio will
only rise by 4.7%. Finally, with a 10% upsurge in administrative wages, the
administrative-assistant ratio increases by 3.7%; but, with a 10% rise in physical therapy
assistant wages, the assistant-administrative staff ratio increases by 7.9%.10

10

In the dataset utilized, the average hourly wages were $36.13 for physical therapists, $21.02 for physical
therapy assistants, and $19.43 for (the non-clinical) administrative staff.
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4.4 Economies of Scale
Finally, operational scale economies at the typical clinic, evaluated (along the
mean expansion path where factor prices are constant and costs are minimum at each
output level) using the expression 1–[∂ ln C/ ∂ln Y], is positive 0.994 (statistically
significant at the 95% confidence level). This indicates positive or cost-beneficial scale
advantages at the typical physical therapy clinic output (patient visits). To gain a richer
insight, we also evaluated the extent of scale economies at the 25% and 75% production
levels and find them to be 1.005 and 0.985, respectively. Thus, there appears to be
diminishing operational scale advantages as the output level rises and the capacity
constraints become more binding. One implication for the physical therapy clinics
already operating close to full capacity is their need to establish new facilities as they
face impending demand pressures in the growing healthcare market.
5.1 Conclusion
Production cost studies of hospitals, nursing homes, health care systems,
specialized hospital pharmacies, dental practices, physician office practices, and mental
health facilities are many in the health economics literature using data of the US and
several developed and developing countries. Due to paucity of data, studies erected on
sound economic theories and econometric methodologies have been lacking in the health
economics literature on production technology cost structure in US physical therapeutic
health care. However, for the many reasons earlier articulated in this paper, the
economics of physical therapy operations are rapidly becoming an important research
area of allied health care due not only to rapid population aging, but also the Patient

29

Protection and Affordable Care Act also mandating the establishment of comparative
effectiveness programs as integral to health care cost containment efforts, expanded
insurance coverage of the currently uninsured, 11 and improved care quality. Therefore,
our study is unique, innovative and timely in its application of the flexible translog dual
cost methodology to model operational efficiency using a bi-weekly comprehensive panel
dataset of physical therapy clinics (over 19,000 observations) with multiple operations
across 28 of the 50 US states for the 2008-2009 period.
The core findings of this study are as follows. Foremost, it is possible to infer the
production technology characteristics in US physical therapy care using a well-behaved
dual translog cost form. 12 Second, the implied underlying production technology structure
is non-homothetic, which means that the cost function cannot be written as a separable
function in output and factor prices. Non-homotheticity implying nonlinear expansion
paths suggests that physical therapy clinic management should optimally re-organize
input factor ratios as output expands. Third, the US physical therapy cost function is
non-homogeneous in output since the elasticity of cost with respect to output is nonconstant. Fourth, data on physical therapy operations are inconsistent with the postulate
of unitary elasticities of substitutions technology. More specifically, there are variations
in the scope for pair-wise factor substitutions, or the isoquant curvature, estimates
computed using four alternative conceptual measures (i.e., cross-price, Allen-Uzawa,

11

Wright (2010) found that US citizens lack universal coverage and pay the highest out-of-pocket (OOP)
health care cost. During the 2007-09 recession about 25% of US population reported reducing health care
use, a rate from twice to five times those in European countries. The new US health care law, if effective,
would likely reduce drastically the shortfall in health care use in times of high-impact economic shocks.
12

The Hessian matrix, ∂C/∂wi∂wj, satisfied the negative semi-definiteness condition, the fitted total cost
and cost shares of the factor inputs are positive at each observation, and all conditional factor demands are
significant and downwardly sloped.
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Shadow, and Morishima). Using the preferred Morishima substitution elasticity
estimates, the physical therapy assistants tend to be a hybrid worker. They may be used
as a substitute for the non-clinical administrative personnel, but are complementary with
the physical therapist as they may contribute directly to increased output within the clinic
at a significantly lower cost. Fifth, while physical therapy cost increases in output, it
does so at a decreasing rate. Finally, that production characterized by positive scale
economies at the mean number of patient visits (output level), as well as the 25% and
75% production levels, suggests that the output expansion at the typical physical therapy
clinic would tend to be cost saving, all else given.
This insightful study has some limitations, however. First, while this study
modeled a rich panel dataset (more than 19,000 observations) of physical therapy clinics
in most of the US states, it is for one national market industry leader operating multiple
sites in each of the 28 of the 50 US states. To date, however, ours is the most
comprehensive analysis of Diewert flexible GTL cost efficiency model estimation for the
US physical therapy care using the latest available panel data of the operators. Second, as
expanded datasets become available future research should control for case-mix and
explore multiple output technologies (e.g., pediatric v/s adult clinics) that address the
nature of scope economies for the competing provider clinics throughout the US. The
future research directions are likely to enrich efforts targeted at conducting policy-rich
work on broad-based cost containment innovations at the practitioner and regulatory
levels.
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Chapter 2: Do Alternative Mean Concepts of Approximation in Generalized Translog
Cost Model Matter for Technology Structure? An Application to U.S.
Physical Therapy Production12
1.1

Introduction
The US health sector spending growth is expected to reach 8.3% in 2014 when

major coverage expansions from the 2010 passage of the Affordable Care Act begins to
raise health care demand significantly (Keehan et al., 2011). The health share of GDP is
also anticipated to rise rapidly to 20.3% in 2018 (Sisko et al., 2009). These growth
projections portend a rapid rise in demand for medical and allied health providers
simultaneously with shortfalls in physician workforce supply and declines in physician
work hours (Park et al., 2011). Consequently, US healthcare is on the brink of
unprecedented change involving broad ranging reforms simultaneously targeting cost
containments, expanded coverage, and improved quality outcomes. Thus, it is imperative
for health care insurers (payers) and providers to rethink their value propositions and
business models (Dumont, Kaura, and Subramanian, 2012).
Specifically within the allied health care industry, physical therapy is gaining
more attention due to the rapid rise in demand for their services from population ageing,
disease-induced (e.g., obesity, diabetes, lupus, sickle cell) physical deterioration (e.g.,
femoral head osteonecrosis, osteoarthritis) and the cost-reducing policy reimbursement
imperatives arising from the resurgence of interests in ‘comparative effectiveness’
evidence (Durlak 1979, Selker, 2009, Golub and Fontanarosa, 2011) aimed at raising

1

This work was completed under the supervision and direction of Dr. Albert A. Okunade.

2

An earlier version of this research was presented at the 86 th Annual Western Economic Association
International Conference in San Diego, CA.
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payments to the more efficient clinicians and health services providers across competing
treatment technologies for a given disease. Physical therapy health care competes with or
complements other treatment technologies that range from speech pathology therapy and
surgical interventions to pharmacotherapy, among others.
Due to paucity of data, physical therapy care has historically been largely ignored
in health care economics modeling. Recently, Lubiani (2012), using a US, panel dataset
of physical therapy clinics established for the industry a baseline production technology
cost structure. The current study is innovative by presenting the first findings of physical
therapy production technology cost that adjusts the output measure to reflect production
quality, controls for pediatric clinics, and investigates how the choice of the mean
concept used for the expansion point influences estimates of the fitted model parameters,
pair-wise input factor relationships, and economies of scale. Our findings suggest that
the particular concept of the mean (arithmetic, geometric, and harmonic) used as the
expansion point impacts the shape of the underlying technology structure implied by the
fitted dual cost function. These findings caution researchers against the simple choice of
arithmetic mean as the expansion point.
The generalized translog (GTL) dual cost, shadow profit or production function
methodology is widely used in applied econometrics modeling of activity analysis in the
aggregate economy, manufacturing and service industries and specific establishments.
Using the Lubiani (2012) national dataset, our investigation specifies the GTL dual cost
model for estimation using the Iterative Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation
(ISURE) technique. In the spirit of Shepherd’s lemma, inferences are then made
regarding the production technology parameter structure from a well-behaved dual cost
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function. The GTL model has been used in studies of broad ranging industries, such as
energy (Boluk, 2010), agriculture (Kavoi, 2009), health systems (e.g., Hollingsworth and
Wildman, 2003; Suraratdecha and Okunade, 2006), primary care (Guiffrida, Gravelle and
Sutton, 2000), physician practices (Escarce and Pauly, 1998; Nassiri, 2006); home health
services (Kass, 1987), hospitals (Banker et al., 1986, Vitaliano, 1987; Vita, 1990; Deiley
and McKay, 2006), dentistry (Grytten and Dalen, 1997; Okunade, 1999), hospital
pharmacies (Okunade, 1993, Okunade 2001), HMOs (Rosenman, Siddharthan, and
Ahern, 1997; Okunade, 2003), and others.
Past GTL models in health economics, without an a priori theoretical reasoning
or statistical testing but as a matter of historical habit or mere convenience, assumed the
arithmetic mean as optimal expansion point, although a few modeling financial data with
the GTL cost, revenue or profit functions (see, for example, Hunter and Timme, 1986;
Huang, 2000; Huang 2002) adopted a geometric mean expansion point but without an
explicit justification. Rather than assuming the standard arithmetic mean expansion point
as optimal, we tested its appropriateness along with the geometric and harmonic means.
This is because the alternative mean concepts may have significant implications for the
robustness of estimated scale economies and pair-wise factor relationships (e.g., ownand cross- price, Morishima and shadow elasticities of substitutions). The arithmetic
mean is a more appropriate choice for restricted technology structures, such as the
Leontief production model, more flexible technologies call for expansion points of a
more dynamic nature. While both geometric and harmonic means are better suited for
measuring pair-wise factor input relationships, the geometric mean approximation is a
better choice when production technology is characterized by non-linear expansion paths.
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The elasticities of substitution measures calculated based on each of the mean concepts of
approximation suggest statistically different relationships for input pairs. Moreover, the
differing expansion points suggest significantly different economies of scale, measured at
the 25%, 50%, and 75% output levels for each. Thus, the restricted models must first be
tested to determine the more appropriate mean expansion point for making inferences on
policy and resource allocation decisions..
The balance of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the applicable
literature. Section 3 proposes a theoretical TL dual cost model for inferring the
technological characteristics in US physical therapy care. Section 4 discusses findings
and implications, and section 5 presents the concluding remarks.
2.1 Previous Literature
Economic literature examining physical therapy markets is quite sparse, due in
large part to the dearth of data on the topic. Bohannon (1984) initially examined physical
therapist productivity through studying a single clinic for 20 days, and reasoned that the
results achieved by the most productive physical therapist were capable of being reached
by all. In a follow-up paper (1987), he conducted a 30-day study where the clinical and
staff hours worked were defined as inputs, while count visits and the number of
procedures performed were taken as output measures. Using linear regression, he
determined that hours charged was the most appropriate productivity measure for
physical therapists.
The GTL cost and production function approaches have been employed in health
economic literature on numerous occasions. Drawing from Shepherd’s duality, a well40

behaved cost function implies a well-behaved production function. Most recently
(Lubiani G. 2012), using a national dataset, reported input factor relationships in the
production of physical therapeutic healthcare as measured by the cross-price elasticity of
factor demands and the alternative measures of the pair-wise elasticities of substitution
(such as, Allen-Uzawa partial elasticity, Morishima elasticity, and Shadow elasticity) for
the three labor groups (physical therapists, physical therapy assistants, and administrative
staff). This paper will further advance the understanding of these relationships for the
purposes of policy implications through both enhancement of, and analysis of expansion
point chosen for, the production cost structure model for U.S. physical therapy health
care. The model is first augmented through the adjustment of the output measure (patient
visits) to reflect the quality of care with controls for pediatric health centers. Moreover,
the enhanced model is estimated at three different mean (arithmetic, geometric,
harmonic) expansion points, as are all the restricted models, elasticity measurements, and
economies of scale.
Although the GTL model has been used extensively for modeling cost and
production (as earlier discussed in this study) the choice of expansion point has varied.
The usual expansion point is the arithmetic mean, a mathematically simpler concept
possessing greater familiarity with a larger number of situations. In contrast, however,
few choose the rarely used geometric mean concept for the approximation point. It
captures a more interactive average term, as opposed to the straight summation term of
the arithmetic mean, and is thus better suited when restrictive production technologies is
not suitable for modeling the observed data. Finally considered is the harmonic mean
expansion point. Although not as common as the arithmetic and geometric means in the
41

pertinent literature, it is sometimes used in economic indexes and measurements, it is
better taken as an average of rates used to accomplish the same task (such as is often used
to calculate average speeds for set distances).
3.1 Theoretical Model and Data
3.2 The Generalized Translog Cost Model
The generalized translog (TL) model is a second-order Taylor series
approximation, and places no a priori restrictions on input factor relationships. Using
Shepherd’s duality, a well-behaved cost function is that of an underlying production
technology.
It is a reasonable assumption that physical therapy healthcare facilities act as if
they seek to minimize variable costs for producing a quality-adjusted output level (Y)
given that input prices (Wi) are exogenous to the clinic operators while holding fixed the
capital capacity (D). Each of the employed worker types (therapists, technicians, and
administrators) plays specific roles in care production. Physical therapists are licensed
professional clinicians and their assisting technicians are trained paraprofessionals who
function in narrowly defined clinical roles. Therefore, technicians are supervised partial
substitutes for some clinical tasks and they serve in additional complementary capacities.
Interestingly, Durlak’s (1979) review of 42 studies comparing the effectiveness of
professionals and paraprofessional helpers find that paraprofessionals achieved clinical
outcomes equal to or more superior than those of the licensed professionals. Regulations
determine the scope of professional independence and these vary across the US states.
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The wages for each worker group, (Wc, Ws, Wn), are reasonably exogenous to the clinics,
given that they are acquired in competitive labor markets.
Moreover, output is reasonably exogenous in that most patients are referred to
physical therapy clinics by physicians and other health care providers. There is limited
evidence suggesting that some physical therapists treating patients without physician
referral benefit at the expense of other therapists and that the psychic incomes (or nonmonetary benefits) accruing to physical therapist gaining professional independence from
physician control is associated with reduced incomes (Sass and Nichols, 1996). This
mimics a more recent finding (Dueker et al., 2005) of greater independence of advanced
practice nurses (APNs) from physician control leads to a substantial income reduction,
whereas incomes of the physician assistants (PAs) who must work under the supervision
of physicians but also compete directly with the APNs are significantly higher.
The quality ratio used to adjust the output measure is reasonably exogenous, as
the physical therapy clinics are restricted by state licensing and regulatory requirements.
The quality ratio is defined as the fraction of the CPT codes of total procedures involving
more direct hands-on care of the physical therapist. One possible critique of this quality
measure in nursing home care is that the setting of a higher level of minimum required
direct care staffing (e.g., clinician’s hands-on CPT codes) when quality is multidimensional creates potential incentives for offsetting quality improvement practices
(Bowblis and Lucas, 2012). This notwithstanding, service quality (input, process, and
outcome) regulation remains important in physical therapy health care, a service industry
in which quality observability and enforceability are imperfect. there is a body of work
(Buranabunyut and Peoples, 2012) suggesting that an incentive regulation leads to a
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superior factor input use allocation in a competitive business environment. Finally, our
proposed TL dual cost model includes state level fixed-effects accounting for statespecific regulatory instruments and other geographic site peculiarities.
The implicit physical therapeutic cost structure (ln C) model including four input
prices (Wis) and the quality-adjusted output (Y), and allowing for state fixed-effects of
technology changes with controls for clinic size and adult/pediatric status, is

lnC =

∑

(∑ ∑

)

(1)
∑
Minimizing cost (lnC) subject to output Y is differentiated with respect to four
inputs p (physical therapist), s (physical therapy assistant), n (administrative staff), and r
(rent). The dual cost equation is

(2)
Subject to Y =
Shepherd’s Lemma may then by applied by differentiating ln C with respect to Wi
to produce the four factor-share equations below:
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(3)
The error term,

, reflects the random effects, as well as omitted variables, of the

factor costs that are separate from the original cost equation error term,

. The

following theoretical restrictions for homogeneity are placed on the cost and factor share
equations

(4)
3.3 Alternative Mean Concepts for the Expansion Point
This research will present three alternative models, each taken at varying
expansion points. The first hypothesized expansion point is the arithmetic mean, defined
below:

(5)
Eq. (5) represents an appropriate approximation point when the factors, combined
together, produce a sum total. It is sensitive to outliers, relative to alternative mean
approximations. It can be further demonstrated that its partial derivative with respect to
the i-th observation for the arithmetic mean is
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(6)

It then follows that the second partial derivative for the arithmetic mean is zero.
Hence, the rate of increase for the arithmetic mean is constant with the i-th observation.
However, this could potentially represent an overstatement when the rate of change is
non-constant. As it relates to the GTL cost function, it is therefore most appropriate for
restrictive production technologies, such as the Leontief production model. However, if
estimates of the economic content are not statistically different between the arithmetic
mean and the alternative approximations, the arithmetic mean could still be an
appropriate choice due to its greater universality.
To examine possible policy implications from choosing alternate expansion points
and the estimates that they produce for both the cost structure model, multiple elasticity
estimates, and economies of scale measurements if there is possibly a non-constant rate
of change, we also estimate the second model from the geometric mean:

(7)
The geometric mean is more commonly used to evaluate rates of change when the
rate of change can’t be reasonably assumed as constant. It is less sensitive to outliers
than the arithmetic measure, and more appropriately captures a representative value for
production technologies that demonstrate non-constant input factor relationships. It will
never be greater than the arithmetic mean.
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Finally, the third model is estimated as an expansion from the harmonic mean:

(8)
The harmonic mean, utilized here as a third comparison group, is most commonly
used to evaluate average rates with some constant output produced. As the number of
observations increases, the harmonic mean will converge upon the geometric mean more
rapidly than either does upon the arithmetic mean. In this spirit, it is pertinent to not only
consider the theoretical differences in the measurements, but also the number of
observations supplied by the dataset. Thus, we include the primary model estimates, as
well as multiple elasticity and economies of scale estimates taken from each expansion
point to evaluate the effect on inferences derived for policy-making decisions.
3.4 Data
The dataset for this study stems from an industry-leading provider of physical
therapeutic healthcare services. It is a panel dataset of thirteen bi-weekly observations
for over 400 clinics located in 27 states, totaling over 4,500 observations. The dataset
includes the hours worked by each labor group (physical therapists, physical therapy
assistants, and administrative staff) for each two-week period at each care center, and an
approximate square footage. Additionally, it includes the total number of CPT codes
performed for each observation, as well as the number of CPT codes deemed to involve
the most “one-on-one” contact (as self-reported by the physical therapy healthcare center)
between the patient and the physical therapist. Finally, the data contains the number of
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patient visits for each observation. The patient visits are taken as reasonably exogenous
to the clinic, as most are a product of referrals from other healthcare providers and selfpay patients.
Applying the mean hourly wage, as reported by the U.S. Census Bureau, for each
state to the appropriate labor type, we are able to calculate the total cost of each labor
group for each observation. In addition, the mean rental rates per square foot (taken from
www.loopnet.com) in each zip code were applied to the approximate square footage to
derive the total rental cost in each observation as a measure of capital. Further, we
multiplied the number of patient visits by the ratio of “one-on-one” CPT codes to total
CPT codes (the quality ratio) to arrive at a quality-adjusted patient visit output measure.
This method of quality adjustment, reflecting how care is given, is consistent with service
sector research when outcomes aren’t easily observable, and prevents measurement error
that could arise from patient and environmental influences on health outcome.
Exogeneity of output is still reasonably assumed through state licensing and regulations
regarding physical therapy care.
Table 1 contains the descriptive statistics of key variables in the production cost
model, taken at the three alternative mean measurements. It is clear that, with each mean
concept, the quality ratio is consistent across each at approximately 82%. This finding is
as expected, because there is little variation in the quality ratio across clinics due to the
licensing and regulatory requirements for patient care within each state (controlled for in
the model with state-level fixed effects). However, the quality-adjusted patient visits do
vary significantly across clinics, as do the dollar expenses for each factor input. As a
result, the arithmetic means for each are significantly larger as they are more sensitive to
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extreme values, as was discussed previously. However, the geometric and harmonic mean
statistics for the input factor expense and output measures are not statistically different.3
This is most likely due to the more rapid convergence of the two means, relative to the
arithmetic mean, for a sufficiently large numbers of observations.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics of selected, main variables in the cost model
Variable
Arithmetic
Geometric
Harmonic
1657.76
1382.85
1382.85
Rent ($)
Physical Therapist
6232.35
4840.78
4840.78
expense ($)
Administrative Staff
1220.90
940.73
940.74
expense ($)
PT Asst expense ($)
1036.62
513.37
514.98
Rent Share (%
16.34
18.01
18.01
expense)
PT Share (% expense) 61.42
63.05
63.04
Admin Share (%
12.03
12.25
12.25
expense)
PT Asst Share (%
10.22
6.69
6.71
expense)
Quality Ratio (%)
82.19
81.91
81.91
Quality-Adjusted
178.49
144.38
144.90
Patient Visits
(number)

3

William Greene’s (2012) publicly available panel dataset (2,500 observations), “Bank Cost Data”, was
evaluated by the author, and found to have geometric and harmonic mean estimates of the key variables
also very close than the arithmetic mean
(http://people.stern.nyu.edu/wgreene/Econometrics/PanelDataSets.htm).
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4.1 Empirical Results
4.2 Generalized Translog Cost Function Estimation
Insight into production technology structures may be made from the production
cost structure through duality, conditional upon meeting the requirements for a wellbehaved cost function. The previous model estimated (Lubiani G. 2012) met these
requirements; however, this did not include any adjustments for output quality, controls
for pediatric care, or alternative expansion points. Thus, the new models with qualityadjusted output are all analyzed to ensure compliance with these requirements. With
each model, the cost is non-decreasing in all factor inputs, and is homogenous of degree 1
in input factor prices. Further, each produces a negative semi-definite Hessian matrix
indicating concavity in factor prices. Also, cross-price effects are symmetric and the
own-price effects are non-positive for each expansion point. Therefore, with qualityadjusted output, the models echo a well-behaved production technology in physical
therapy health care clinics.
Employing the ISURE methodology, with 3SLS, the TL cost functions are
estimated using the arithmetic, geometric, and harmonic mean approximation points. As
displayed in Table 2, the coefficient estimates for each labor category are statistically
different with each expansion point, as are the coefficient estimates for the qualityadjusted patient visits measuring the output. Also shown is the statistical significance of
the dummy variable for pediatric clinics, suggesting a differing cost structure than adult
clinics. However, the coefficients for the pediatric care control, interaction term
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coefficients between input factors, and between quality-adjusted output and the input
factors within each model are not statistically different from one another.
Beyond the consistency of interaction coefficient estimates, each model produces
a system-weighted R2=0.9703. Thus, while there were notable statistical differences
between some parameter estimates, each model still yielded identical goodness of fit.
Further, each model was then estimated in restricted forms to test for homotheticity,
homogeneity, unitary elasticities of substitution, homotheticity and unitary elasticity of
substitution, and homogeneity with unit-elasticities of substitution. Once again, each
expansion point specification produced system-weighted R2 results of 0.9682, 0.9671,
0.8395, 0.8150, and 0.8150, respectively. As seen below in Table 3, the results of the Ftest hypothesis signal that the restricted models are inappropriate for modeling qualityadjusted physical therapy production structures. As such, the most commonly used
arithmetic mean expansion point tends to provide misleading estimates for input factor
relationships and economies of scale for the purposes of policy and resource allocation
decision making. Moreover, the harmonic mean estimates also provides potentially
misleading estimates when chosen as the expansion point due to the statistically
significant variation in output levels across clinics, within clinics across time, and nonconstant relationship between input factors and the output.
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Table 2: ISURE Parameter estimates for the generalized translog variable cost function
for physical therapy clinics
Coefficient
Arithmetic
Geometric
Harmonic
-0.308***
0.146***
0.214***
(Constant)
Physical Therapist
0.547***
0.462***
0.471***
(P.T.)
Administrative Staff
0.204***
0.257***
0.260***
(Admin)
Physical Therapy
0.034***
0.127***
0.130***
Assistant
(Asst)
P.T.-P.T.
0.105***
0.105***
0.105***
P.T.-Admin
-0.074***
-0.074***
-0.074***
P.T.-Asst
-0.032***
-0.032***
-0.032***
Admin-Admin
0.067***
0.067***
0.067***
Admin-Asst
0.007***
0.007***
0.007***
Asst-Asst
0.025***
0.025***
0.025***
Patient Visits
0.028***
0.040***
0.042***
(Output)
Output-Output
0.006***
0.006***
0.006***
Output-P.T.
0.017***
0.017***
0.017***
Output-Admin
-0.012***
-0.012***
-0.012***
Output-Asst
0.005***
0.005***
0.005***
0.070***
0.070***
0.070***

Table 3: ISURE estimates of unrestricted (A) v/s restricted (B, C, D, E, F) translog cost
models
Homotheticity Homogeneity Unitary
Homotheticity Homogeneity
Elasticities and Unitary
and Unitary
of
Elasticities of Elasticities of
Substitution Substitution
Substitution
Number of 2
3
3
5
6
Restrictions
F-Statistic
8.40
12.80
523.13
621.12
621.12
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4.3 Own and Cross-Price Elasticities of Factor Demands
A primary advantage of the GTL cost function lies in its use for calculating
alternative conceptual measures of the elasticities of pair-wise factor substitutions. These
aid in policy-making decisions, as they allow physical therapy health care center
operators to properly adjust the use of all labor types in response to a given change in
exogenous price while maintaining current quality-adjusted production levels. The ownand cross- price elasticities for each model are presented below in Table 4. As shown,
the input factor relationships are statistically different from one another across the
competing expansion points. Therefore, researchers should be cautious in the selection of
an expansion point concept when conducting research carrying decision-making
implications for policy. For the previously discussed reasons, the arithmetic mean is
likely an inappropriate mean approximation concept. As demonstrated below in Table 4,
we see that an arithmetic mean expansion point provides statistically significant different
inferences from the geometric mean expansion point with regard to own and cross-price
elasticities. Most notably, the arithmetic mean approximation indicates complementarity
between physical therapists and physical therapy assistants. However, when calculated
from the geometric mean model estimates, the two are shown to be substitutes.
The harmonic mean is also concluded to be a potentially erroneous approximation
choice since output varies significantly across physical therapy healthcare clinics, as well
as within the same clinic across time. Table 4 estimates indicate that the own-price
elasticity measurements derived from the harmonic mean model are not statistically
different from those of the geometric mean model, but the cross-price elasticities differ
significantly (although in most cases they tend to mimic the geometric mean estimates
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more than the arithmetic estimates). This seems to conform to the theoretical form of
each mean, in that the harmonic and geometric means are expected to converge more
rapidly than either will to the arithmetic mean.

Table 4: Own and Cross-Price Elasticities
Arithmetic

Geometric

Harmonic

PT-PT

-0.261
(0.001)

-0.310
(0.001)

-0.309
(0.001)

PTA-PTA

-0.232
(0.003)

-0.676
(0.003)

-0.677
(0.003)

Admin-Admin

-0.468
(0.001)

-0.483
(0.001)

-0.483
(0.001)

PT-PTA

-0.024
(<0.001)

0.058
(<0.001)

0.063
(<0.001)

PT-Admin

0.069
(<0.001)

0.098
(<0.001)

0.104
(<0.001)

PTA-Admin

0.397
(0.003)

0.309
(0.003)

0.311
(0.003)

PTA-PT

-0.381
(0.004)

0.213
(0.004)

0.227
(0.004)

Admin-PT

0.186
(0.001)

0.175
(0.001)

0.188
(0.001)

Admin-PTA

0.067
(0.001)

0.153
(0.001)

0.155
(0.001)
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4.4 Morishima Elasticities of Substitution Estimates
The Allen partial elasticities of substitution are defined as:
, measuring cross-price elasticity of demand between factors i and j from
a cost-share weighted perspective. However, research has shown that the Allen partial
elasticities are inappropriate when relationships between more than two inputs are being
measured. Hence, we estimate the Morishima and Shadow elasticities, accepted as more
appropriate input factor relationship estimates when multiple factors are being examined.
The Morishima elasticity of demand is defined as

(

)

. This measure is a 2-factor 1-price substitution elasticity concept capturing the
change in factor input ratio as the price of input j varies. The Morishima estimates for
each model are presented in Table 5. Relative to the standard own- and cross- price
elasticity estimates, the Morishima elasticity measures reflect greater substitutability for
labor input pairs in production.
As previously noted, the contrasting expansion points signify statistically different
inferences regarding technological relationships amongst input factors for policy-making
assessments. As illustrated in Table 5, all Morishima elasticity measurements are
statistically different at each mean expansion point. Once again, the estimates provided
by the geometric and harmonic mean models tend to be more similar to each other than
those provided by the arithmetic expansion point.
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Table 5: Morishima Elasticities
Arithmetic
PT-PTA
0.208
0.0001
PT-Admin
0.534
0.000005
PTA-Admin
0.865
0.0001
PTA-PT
-0.120
0.00009
Admin-PT
0.446
0.000006
Admin-PTA
0.299
0.0001

Geometric
0.734
0.000009
0.580
0.000004
0.791
0.00001
0.523
0.00001
0.486
0.000005
0.829
0.00001

Harmonic
0.740
0.000009
0.586
0.000004
0.793
0.00001
0.533
0.00001
0.494
0.000005
0.832
0.00001

4.5 Shadow Elasticities of Substitution Estimates
The shadow pair-wise elasticity of demand is calculated for each input factor
relationship and presented in Table 6. The shadow elasticity, expressed as
, demonstrates a 2-factor 2-price

substitution effect at some constant unit cost. The shadow elasticity estimates are arrayed
in Table 6. Consistent with previous research, these elasticities signal a greater
inelasticity among factor inputs. We also note that the geometric and harmonic mean
expansion point shadow elasticity estimates have converged, reflecting a statistically
similar relationships, while still statistically different from the estimates provided by the
arithmetic mean expansion point.
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Table 6: Shadow Elasticities
Arithmetic
PT-PTA
0.005
0.000007
PT-Admin
0.043
0.001
PTA-Admin
0.002
0.00001

Geometric
0.014
0.001
0.050
0.0002
0.009
0.0001

Harmonic
0.015
0.002
0.051
0.0009
0.009
0.0001

4.6 Estimates of Economies of Scale
We further analyze the effects of expansion point mean concept choice by
computing the economies of scale (EOS) estimates for each expansion point at the 75%,
50%, and 25% quartiles. By expressing scale economies as the relationship between
output and cost along the expansion path, we are able to calculate EOS at each point by:
EOS = 1 – (δlnC / δlnY)

(9)

Taken from the estimated GTL cost model, the EOS estimate at the data
percentiles is computed as:
EOS = 1- (δy + δyylnY + ∑

)

(10)

As seen presented in Table 7, the choice of a mean concept for an expansion point for the
main model has powerful policy-making implications as it relates to EOS as well. More
specifically, there appears to be diminishing EOS benefits as the production level rises.
However, of the three different mean expansion point concepts, the arithmetic mean
reveals the largest EOS estimate, while the harmonic mean concept reports the smallest
EOS estimate. For instance, the largest EOS, represented by the smallest output level
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clinics in the harmonic mean model, are still enjoyed by the largest output level clinics
when the model is examined from the perspective of the arithmetic mean expansion point
model. Finally, we observe that, as before, the geometric mean expansion point model
provides estimates between those given by the arithmetic and harmonic mean concepts
(although, once again closer to that of the harmonic mean). Once again, we attribute this
to the fact that geometric and harmonic means converge to each other more rapidly as the
number of observations increases than either does to the arithmetic mean.

Table 7: Economies of Scale
Arithmetic
75%
0.915
50%
0.935
25%
0.960

Geometric
0.901
0.912
0.917

Harmonic
0.899
0.907
0.915

4.7 Quality-Adjusted Output
In addition to the empirical investigation of alternative mean conceptual measures
for the GTL cost function, the research also presents the first economic findings of
quality-adjusted output for the physical therapy industry. Previously, the author
presented the GTL cost model for physical therapy production, and its underlying
economic content, without any adjustments made for quality of production (Lubiani G.
2012). That model had been taken from the arithmetic mean, and may be compared to
the results presented in this study stemming from the same arithmetic mean conceptual
model.
58

While all Own and Cross-Price elasticities are statistically different between the
two studies, there is greater Own Price elasticity in quality-adjusted physical therapy
healthcare production. Though, there is greater inelasticity amongst the Cross-Price
measurements, with the exception of administrative staff responses to physical therapy
assistant wages. Further, the Morishima elasticity measurements indicate that the ratio of
physical therapist to both labor groups is less responsive in producing quality-adjusted
patient visits. Additionally, while physical therapy assistants were a Morishima
substitute for physical therapists in unadjusted physical therapy care, they appear to be
compliments for quality-adjusted care. Finally, after making adjustments for the quality
of production, the EOS available have diminished relative to the unadjusted model at all
production levels (25%, 50%,75%).
5.1 Conclusion
For the previously discussed reasons, the physical therapy sector will continue to
experience increasing demand, while the quantity of physical therapists is expected to
grow at a slower pace. Thus, continued research into the production technology
structures is needed in economic literature. The study presented provides the first
evaluation of the quality-adjusted production cost structure of physical therapy health
care while controlling for pediatric care clinics and, continuing, the derived input factor
relationships. The results present a well-behaved cost function, and support the more
flexible GTL production cost specification over the alternative restricted production
specifications. Thus, practitioners would be best served to re-allocate utilization of labor
types as output expands. Contrary to the previous study, the new models presented that
adjust output to reflect quality demonstrate costs increase at an increasing rate with an
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increase in production. Additionally, the statistically significant coefficient estimates for
pediatric physical therapy care suggests a differing cost structure from adult care centers.
Finally, economies of scale are presented at the 75%, 50%, and 25% quartiles, indicating
positive, yet diminishing in size, scale economies.
Further evaluation is conducted to examine the policy implications of alternate
mean expansion points on these relationships, as each provide differing inferences
regarding production technology. As demonstrated, the choice of expansion point carries
significant weight in the inferred input factor relationships. The findings indicate the
arithmetic mean to be an inappropriate choice for expansion point. Representing a “sum
of parts” production mean, it is more appropriate for use with restricted technology
structures (such as the Leontief production model). From the estimates, we conclude that
the results derived from the arithmetic model misrepresent the pair-wise input factor
relationships. It is clear, given the high statistical significance of all the interaction terms,
the elasticity measurements, and rejection of all restricted models, that a more dynamic
mean concept for the expansion point is in order. However, with the varying nature of
the quality-adjusted outputs across locations, in addition to the exogenously determined
output level, the harmonic mean also misrepresented the substitutability/complementarity
for input pairs, although it tends to be closer to the estimates from the geometric mean
model. Consequently, for the fitted GTL cost model, the geometric mean expansion
point is optimal. This finding stems from statistically significant, dynamic interactions of
the various labor groups with each other, as well as with the output measure.
Despite its multi-dimensional contributions, this study has limitations. First, the
quality-adjusted output measure is defined as a ratio of the CPT codes representing the
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fraction of total procedures involving more direct hands-on care of the physical therapist.
However, portions of these codes were self-reported and identified by each attending
physical therapist or clinic operator for the purposes of internal tracking of the quality of
physical therapists. The quality ratio is applied to the patient visit output measure is still
taken as reasonably exogenous due to its linkage to various licensing and regulatory
requirements. Second, while this research is based on a unique and comprehensive panel
dataset with over 4,000 observations in 27 U.S. states, all of the clinics are operated by
one national, industry-leading physical therapy provider. Subject to these caveats, this
study for the first time in health care economics modeling, (1) conducted a more rigorous
investigation of the rapidly growing but less studied physical therapy industry segment,
(2) controlled for pediatric clinic operations and find their cost effects to be statistically
significant relative to those of the adults, (3) statistically tested and find the geometric
mean concept as optimal for the GTL cost model expansion point, (4) innovated with
modeling cost as a function of a quality-adjusted output measure, and (5) fitted the model
to a higher-frequency bi-weekly panel dataset.
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Chapter 3: Differences in Production Cost Structures of U.S. Adult v/s Pediatric Physical
Therapy Care 12
1.1 Introduction
Research is scant on the economics of physical therapy industry operations in
health economics literature. This contrasts with the large numbers of studies on the
economics of health systems, hospitals, pharmacies, nursing homes, physician practices,
dentistry, and others (Lubiani and Okunade, 2012a). The US demand for patient care in
the allied health segment of the medical marketplace is projected to rise significantly in
the next decades for a number of reasons. More specifically, needs for physical therapy is
gaining increased momentum due to favorable economic, regulatory and demographic
shift factors.
First is the rapidly aging population. As the body ages, the necessity for physical
therapy naturally rises with physical deterioration. Next, physical rehabilitation almost
always follows major surgeries (e.g., heart operations and hip replacements). US studies
project Medicare costs to continue rising significantly with growth in the number of
disabled elderly population (Bhattacharya, 2004) and pediatric age population with
disease states requiring physical strengthening. That is, physical therapists serve patients
across life course, with some even specializing in pediatrics. Third, the potential impact
of recent health care reforms expanding coverage for millions of currently uninsured is
expected to impact greatly on physical therapy operations. Since physical therapy aids in
surgical recoveries and improving range-of-motion and flexibility in patients it is not
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viewed as a life-saving treatment process. Consequently, reduced financial burden from
an expanded coverage of the currently self-insured can greatly impact such a sub-sector
within health care (Banthin, 2006). Finally, there are significant interests in developing
a greater understanding of the economic content of physical therapy healthcare operations
from investigating the degree to which the technological characteristics of production are
capable of accommodating input substitution arising from a change in relative factor
prices as a strategy for minimizing operational costs for a given production level (Sinclair
et al., 2005). There is the corollary need to probe and understand the cost implications of
the differences in the adult versus pediatric configuration of physical therapy care.
An earlier study provided the first major insight into the industry’s cost structure,
pair-wise input factor interchanges, and economies of scale opportunities at output level
quartiles using patient-visits output measure (Lubiani and Okunade, 2012a). Their
follow-up work (Lubiani and Okunade, 2012b): (1) adjusted physical therapy output for
quality of care (defined as the CPT code based ratio of “hands-on” care the clinically
trained therapist delivered), (2) statistically tested the appropriateness of using three
alternative concepts of the mean as the expansion point in the generalized translog (GTL)
model estimation, and (3) augmented the estimated model with a dummy control to
reflect clinics primarily treating pediatric patients. (Finding the pediatric indicator
variable highly statistically significant signifies a potentially different technology cost
structure, input factor relationships, and scale economies; however, this control is limited
in its capacity to capture the differences in all of the slope parameter estimates between
the bifurcated patient groups.).
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Consequently, the goal of the current research is to separately model the adult and
pediatric clinics data in order to capture fully the differences in production technologies,
test statistical significance and evaluate efficiency implications of the technology cost
structure differences concerning economies of scale, factor demand elasticities, and the
alternative conceptual measures of pair-wise factor substitution elasticities. The GTL
dual cost structures are modeled using a national dataset and algorithmically estimated
with the Iterative Seemingly Unrelated Regression Estimation (ISURE) technique. The
GTL cost results are tested against the more restrictive models, all of which are rejected
in favor of the more general form. The use of Shepherd’s duality theorem enables us to
gain richer insights into the underlying technology structures from the well-behaved cost
function (see, for example, Takayama, 1986). This is a familiar method in the modeling
of economic activities, such as production, cost, revenue, and profit; they have also been
applied to investigate healthcare facility operational efficiencies. Nonetheless, our
findings show distinct differences in the technological attributes between adult and
pediatric physical therapy patient clinics.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the applicable
literature. Section 3 specifies and econometrically estimates the GTL dual cost model for
inferring the underlying technology characteristics Section 4 discusses study findings and
implications, and section 5 presents the conclusion.
2.1 Previous Literature
Pediatric care represents a different approach for healthcare practitioners due to
the different physical capabilities and maturities from adult patients, and also because of
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possible parental involvements in the clinical process (Ammentorp et al., 2005). More
specifically, the case of parental involvement and satisfaction may become exacerbated
with increases in the US Hispanics population and the different cultural aspects of health
care. Previous studies found that racial and ethnic differences impact the assessments of
healthcare provided (Weech-Maldonado et al. 2001). The impact of parental interference
is not limited to involvement during the delivery of care. Parents are often less protective
of the children within the household and this leads to potential in-home injuries requiring
physical therapy intervention (Gaines J and Schwebel D. 2009). Thus, it is reasonable to
expect physical therapy practitioners to conduct operations for pediatric patients in a
manner different from the adult patients.
Aside from the very limited early attempts in the 1980s to tease out the economic
contents of physical therapy centers through analysis of small sample data (Bohannon,
1984; Bohannon, 1987), there has been a large void in the health economics literature on
physical therapy. Recently, Lubiani and Okunade (2012a, 2012b) established a baseline
industry cost structure in physical therapy healthcare based on a comprehensive national
dataset of bi-weekly (panel) site-specific observations, covering 27 states over almost 14
months (Lubiani and Okunade, 2012). They probed relationships among the labor inputs
(of physical therapists, technicians, and management), from factor demands to elasticities
of factor substitutions and cross-price elasticities of demand, and further investigated any
opportunities for scale economies. Lubiani and Okunade (2012b) later adjusted the output
measure to reflect the care quality produced.
Quality regulations and standards are multi-dimensional concepts; they are
challenging to formulate, accurately measure, and reward or incentivize appropriately
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through the optimal design of pricing and reimbursement mechanisms in the service
sector generally (Sappington, 2005) and in health care operations in particular (Carey and
Stefos, 2010; Bowblis and Lucas, 2012, Marjoua, 2012). Different types of service
quality regulation are known to influence a profit-maximizing provider’s capacity to use
an optimal input mix in production (Buranabunyut and Peoples, 2012). Often, adjusting
for (input, process, or outcome) quality dimensions in healthcare cost functions poses a
formidable challenge to researchers. Further complications arise if outcomes are difficult
to observe but quality can still be accounted for through the activities involved in the care
delivery process. Consequently, we here adjust for care quality through inclusion of a
variable construct capturing the amount (intensity) of the CPT code procedures requiring
more direct contact between physical therapists and patients.
While Lubiani and Okunade (2012a, 2012b) studies are the first to apply the GTL
dual cost modeling method to study physical therapy industry cost efficiency, the model
has been employed in efficiency studies across many industries ranging from
manufacturing to services. This paper provides the first insights into the economics and
operational policy implications of output quality-adjusted, physical therapy healthcare
production, and how the implied technological structures differ between the adult and
pediatric centers.
3.1 Theoretical Model & Data
3.2 Theoretical Model
The generalized translog (GTL) production cost modeling methodology in
economics has long demonstrated its capacity for application in broadly ranged
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industries, from manufacturing to services including health care. Placing no a priori
restrictions on the production technology parameters (e.g., isoquant curvature or the
degree of pair-wise factor substitutability of complementarity relationships), the GTL
dual cost function is a Diewert-flexible, or second-order (twice-continuously
differentiable) Taylor series, approximation to an underlying production technology.
Characteristics of the implied production technology are inherited at the expansion point,
usually the data means. The GTL dual cost model flexibility is far superior to the
conventional arduous method of an explicit functional form specification of the
production function and then solving the cost-minimization problem (Takayama, 1996).
From Shepherd’s duality, insights into the economic contents of the technological
parameters can be derived given the well-behaved cost function.
This study applies the GTL model separately to pediatric and adult physical
therapy healthcare clinic operations, assuming cost-minimization for producing a qualityadjusted output level (Y) given that input wages (Wi) are reasonably exogenous to the
clinic operators having been acquired in competitive factor markets, while holding fixed
the capital capacity (D). Output is also taken as reasonably exogenous, as the clinics are
reliant on referrals from physicians, other healthcare providers, and self-insured patients.
Moreover, state regulatory controls limit the operational flexibility (professional tasks of
each labor type and how output is generated) in physical therapy care, allowing for a
fairly strong exogeneity of the quality ratio utilized for making quality adjustments of the
output to reflect quality of care. Therefore, the exogenously determined input wages and
quality-adjusted output in physical therapy makes the GTL dual cost modeling suitable.
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The cost structure (ln C) model for healthcare operations in the physical therapy
industry, comprising four input prices (Wis) with a quality-adjusted output (Y) while
accounting for state-level fixed-effects to control for different professional regulations,
other policy peculiarities, and technological constraints with controls for clinic size, is

lnC =

∑

(∑ ∑

)
(1)

∑
Minimizing cost (lnC) subject to quality-adjusted output Y is differentiated with
respect to four inputs p (physical therapist), s (physical therapy assistant), n
(administrative staff), and r (rent). The dual cost equation is

(2)
Subject to Y =
The factor-share equations are then derived from Shepherd’s Lemma by differentiating
lnC with respect to Wi , as demonstrated below:
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(3)
The error term,

, reflects the random effects, as well as omitted variables, of the

factor costs that are separate from the original cost equation error term,

. The

following theoretical restrictions for homogeneity are placed on the cost and factor share
equations

(4)
3.3 Data
This research is based on a national dataset from an industry-leading provider of
physical therapy care. With over 4,500 observations, the panel dataset consists of over
400 physical therapy facilities spanning 27 states, with 13 bi-weekly observation periods.
Consisting of the hours worked by each labor group (physical therapists, physical therapy
assistants, and administrative staff) for each two-week period at each care center, the
dataset also includes an approximate square footage for each clinic. Additionally, while
including all CPT codes administered during patient care for each observation, it
distinctly recognizes the amount of “one-on-one” CPT codes (as self-reported by the
physical therapy organization), deemed as involving more direct interaction between the
patient and the physical therapist. Finally, the data contains the number of patient visits
for each observation. While the patient care outcomes are not easily observable, through
analysis of how care is delivered, a quality-adjusted patient visit output measure is
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developed by multiplying the number of patient visits by the ratio of “one-on-one” CPT
codes to total CPT codes (the quality ratio). Common in other service sectors where
observation of outcomes is difficult, this technique of quality adjustment also averts
certain measurement errors stemming from influences outside of the care provided, such
as environmental factors and patient behavior.
Taken from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2009), the mean hourly wage
from each state was applied to the total hours worked for each labor group, providing the
total expense for each labor category within each bi-weekly observation. Further, to
approximate capital expenditures, the mean rental rates per square foot (taken from
www.loopnet.com) in each zip code were multiplied by the approximate square footage
of each healthcare clinic to compute the total rental cost in each observation.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of key variables used in the production cost
model for both adult and pediatric physical therapy healthcare clinics. The differences in
mean values for each variable listed between adult and pediatric care facilities are clearly
evident. Foremost, as is indicated by the mean rental expenditures, most pediatric clinics
are operated in larger facilities and, thus, incur greater expenditures. This is also seen in
the number of quality-adjusted patient visits per bi-weekly period, as visits to pediatric
clinics are more than twice the adult clinics. However, this is also due to the difference
in quality ratio. Adult clinics show an average quality ratio of 81.91%, compared with
94.00% for pediatric operations. Further, it is clear that, consistent with the more “oneon-one” patient care displayed by the higher quality ratio, a much larger percentage of
total costs are spent on physical therapists, and a much smaller percentage is spent on
their physical therapy assistants.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of selected, main variables in the cost
model
Variable
Adult
Pediatric
1382.85
2473.36
Rent ($)
Physical Therapist
4840.78
17014.82
expense ($)
Administrative Staff
940.73
1713.37
expense ($)
PT Asst expense ($)
513.37
631.58
Rent Share (%
18.01
11.62
expense)
PT Share (% expense)
63.05
77.47
Admin Share (%
12.25
7.71
expense)
PT Asst Share (%
6.69
3.19
expense)
Quality Ratio (%)
81.91
94.00
Quality-Adjusted
144.38
295.60
Patient Visits (number)

4.1 Empirical Results
4.2 Generalized Translog Cost Function
A well-behaved dual cost function yields richer insights on production technology
structure. The baseline model Lubiani and Okunade (2012a) estimated satisfied
requirements for a well-behaved cost function; however, output was not quality-adjusted,
there was not any control for pediatric care and the mean expansion concept is arithmetic.
In a follow-up paper (Lubiani and Okunade, 2012b) the quality-adjusted cost function
models from three different expansion point mean concepts (arithmetic, geometric, and
harmonic means) each met the requirements for a well-behaved cost function (geometric
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mean model dominated, however). The models also included a dummy for pediatric
clinics (which was highly statistically significant).
The GTL dual cost models, separately estimated for pediatric and adult physical
therapy clinics and using quality-adjusted output, are each examined for conformity with
the requirements of a well-behaved cost function. Cost is found to be non-decreasing in
all factor inputs, homogenous of degree one in input factor prices, and the negative semidefinite Hessian matrix in the adult and pediatric models signals concavity in factor
prices. The cross-price effects are symmetric and the own-price effects are non-positive
at each expansion point. Therefore, with quality-adjusted output, the models for both
types of physical therapy care indicate a well-behaved underlying production technology.
The GTL dual cost functions for adult and pediatric care facilities are modeled
using the geometric (optimal) mean expansion and ISURE estimation method. Table 2
shows the coefficient estimates for each labor category are statistically different, as are
the coefficient estimates for the quality-adjusted output measure in adult versus pediatric
care. Moreover, all the coefficient estimates in the two models are statistically different
from each other; thereby confirming scientifically that the pediatric and adult physical
therapy healthcare operations have different cost structures and so their respective
underlying production technologies vary.
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Table 2: ISURE parameter estimates for the generalized translog
variable cost function of the physical therapy clinics
Coefficient
Adult
Pediatric
0.161***
0.290
(Constant)
Physical Therapist
0.455***
0.362***
(P.T.)
Administrative Staff
0.267***
0.087***
(Admin)
Physical Therapy
0.131***
0.038***
Assistant
(Asst)
P.T.-P.T.
0.105***
0.039***
P.T.-Admin
-0.074***
-0.041***
P.T.-Asst
-0.032***
0.002***
Admin-Admin
0.068***
0.048***
Admin-Asst
0.005***
-0.007***
Asst-Asst
0.026***
0.005***
Patient Visits (Output) 0.049***
0.135***
Output-Output
0.011***
0.108***
Output-P.T.
0.014***
0.199***
Output-Admin
-0.006***
-0.174***
Output-Asst
0.005***
-0.004***
0.079***
0.097***

In addition to the statistically different coefficient estimates, each model also
yielded slightly different system-weighted R2 estimates of 0.9703 (for adult) and 0.9901
(for pediatric) facilities. The fully-flexible GTL cost model for each population segment
was further tested for restricted technology structures (homotheticity, homogeneity,
unitary elasticity, homotheticity and unitary elasticity, and homogeneity with unitary
elasticity). Once again, each model generated differing system-weighted R2 values,
respectively 0.9684, 0.9673, 0.8358, 0.8125, and 0.8125 for adult-centered operations,
and 0.9242, 0.9244, 0.9170, 0.9064, and 0.9065 for pediatric clinics. These differences n
their restricted technologies notwithstanding, Table 3 showing the F-test hypothesis test
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findings rejects each of the restricted technologies separately for pediatric and adult
physical therapy centers. Since the optimal models separately for both the pediatric and
adult physical therapy centers are the fully flexible GTL dual cost, the remaining
discussions in this study proceed from them.

Table 3: Test Statistics for Homotheticity, Homogeneity, and Unitary Elasticity of Substitution
Homotheticity

Number of
Restrictions
Adult
Pediatric

2

Homogeneity Unitary
Elasticities
of
Substitution
3
3

Homotheticity
and Unitary
Elasticities of
Substitution
5

Homogeneity
and Unitary
Elasticities of
Substitution
6

8.40
32.99

12.80
32.99

621.12
41.91

621.12
41.91

523.13
36.60

4.3 Own & Cross-Price Elasticity
Of the many benefits the GTL cost function provides is the ability to easily
capture input factor relationships in alternate forms from the calculated coefficient
estimates for both models. Multiple elasticity measurements advance the understanding
of professional resource allocation adjustments in the physical therapy industry for both
scholastic and policy applications. Each captures alternative input factor relationship
estimates, indicating how labor type utilizations change in reaction to market wages at
constant quality-adjusted level. The own and cross-price elasticities for each model are
presented below in Table 4. While all the estimates are statistically significant, all own
and cross-price elasticity estimates for adult physical therapy patient care operations are
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statistically different from those for pediatric-centered facilities. Moreover, the nature of
the economic relationship between certain input factors changes between the two models.
For example, physical therapy assistants and administrative staff display a complimentary
relationship in pediatric operations, but act as substitutes in adult care. This suggests that
professional practice regulations tend to allow technicians to undertake more clinical
tasks in adult care as long as they are under the supervision of the licensed physical
therapist. Interestingly, this provocative finding is consistent with Durlak’s (1979) review
of 42 studies comparing the effectiveness of professional and paraprofessional assistants.
He concluded that the clinical outcomes of the assistants are on par with or exceed those
of their more clinically trained supervisors. Physical therapists are professionals and the
technicians are paraprofessionals.
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Table 4: Own and Cross-Price Elasticities
Adult

Pediatric

PT-PT

-0.314
(0.001)

-0.530
(0.008)

PTA-PTA

-0.668
(0.002)

-0.837
(0.006)

Admin-Admin

-0.477
(0.001)

-0.355
(0.029)

PT-PTA

0.062
(0.001)

0.044
(0.002)

PT-Admin

0.106
(0.001)

-0.028
(0.007)

PTA-Admin

0.306
(0.002)

-0.093
(0.017)

PTA-PT

0.215
(0.003)

0.417
(0.017)

Admin-PT

0.180
(0.001)

0.412
(0.029)

Admin-PTA

0.151
(0.001)

-0.041
(0.008)

4.4 Morishima Elasticity
Beyond the own and cross-price elasticities of factor demands, the alternative
conceptual measures of the elasticities of substitution provide further insight into more
dynamic input factor relationships (Bertoletti, 2009). The Allen partial elasticity of
substitution between inputs i and j, defined as

, is a

cost-share weighted measure of the cross-price elasticity of demand between factors i and
j. However, this measure is unsuitable for capturing factor-factor relationships in
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activities involving more than two inputs (Blackorby and Russell. 1989). The Morishima
and shadow elasticities are more suitable in such a case as this study involving more than
two inputs. The Morishima elasticity of demand, defined as
(

)

, is a 2-factor 1-price substitution elasticity concept measuring the

change in factor input ratios due to a change in the price of input j. The separately
computed Morishima estimates for pediatric and adult physical therapy centers are
presented in Table 5.
All of the Morishima pair-wise elasticity of substitution estimates are statistically
significant. Compared with the respective own- and cross-price elasticity estimates, both
the adult and pediatric models show greater scope for substitution in the Morishima
context. Also, in comparison with the earlier findings (Lubiani and Okunade, 2012a;
Lubiani and Okunade, 2012b) estimating one large model and lumping together pediatric
and adult data, the current results confirm that the production technology of adult
physical therapy centers differ appreciably from that of pediatric care.

Table 5: Morishima Elasticities
Adult
PT-PTA
0.730
<0.0001
PT-Admin
0.582
<0.0001
PTA-Admin
0.783
<0.0001
PTA-PT
0.530
<0.0001
Admin-PT
0.494
<0.0001
Admin-PTA
0.818
<0.0001

Pediatric
0.882
0.0001
0.327
0.0012
0.262
0.0019
0.947
0.0005
0.412
0.0013
0.796
0.0002
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4.5 Shadow Elasticity
Finally, the shadow substitution elasticities are calculated for input pairs and
presented in Table 6. They are all statistically significant. The shadow elasticity of
substitution, defined as

, represents a 2-

factor 2-price substitution effect at constant unit cost. As is common to past studies in
other areas of investigation, the shadow elasticity estimates display greater inelasticity for
all input pairs compared with the Morishima conceptual estimates. Additionally, in line
with the previous elasticity measurements, the shadow elasticity estimates for the adult
and pediatric centers are statistically different and so imply different underlying
technology structures for delivering physical therapy healthcare. Therefore, any policymaking decisions regarding input mix reorganization in response to factor price chang(es)
at constant output in this industry must take into consideration the different operational
techniques applied to patient care.

Table 6: Shadow Elasticities
Adult
PT-PTA
0.015
0.0001
PT-Admin
0.052
0.0007
PTA-Admin
0.010
0.0001

Pediatric
0.001
0.0001
0.014
0.0007
0.001
0.0001
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4.6 Economies of Scale Estimates
We further investigated economies of scale (EOS) opportunities separately in
adult and pediatric physical therapy production, and evaluated them at the mean output.
By expressing scale economies as the relationship between output and cost along the
expansion path, EOS becomes:
EOS = 1 – (δlnC / δlnY)

(9)

From the respective estimated GTL dual cost models, EOS for each is computed as:
EOS = 1- (δy + δyylnY + ∑

)

(10)

For adult clinics, the EOS estimate is 0.912. However, for pediatric clinics, the EOS
estimate is 0.785. Thus, there appears to be greater EOS advantages with increasing
production levels for the delivery of physical therapy care for adults than pediatrics.
5.1 Conclusion
Demand for physical therapy services are expected to grow significantly and
outpace growth in the supply of physical therapists. While timely insights from
economics-based research is urgently needed in this industry for policy and operational
decision-making, little is currently available. Using US data, this study provides the first
comparative analysis of quality-adjusted production cost structure in pediatric versus
adult physical therapy health care, as well as insights into pair-wise input relationships
and scale economies.
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The study findings are from a well-behaved cost function, and support the fully
flexible GTL dual cost specification over a number of restricted production technologies.
Therefore, with increases in quality-adjusted output, physical therapy operations may
alter the input mix to minimize costs, as revealed by own- and cross-price, Morishima,
and shadow elasticities of demand and substitution measures. Also, economies of scale
estimates are presented signifying diminishing increases in cost with given increases in
quality-adjusted output. Finally, the pediatric clinic model results are compared with the
estimates derived for adult physical therapy production, and are found to be statistically
different. Pediatric clinics are found to put a greater emphasis on the physical therapist in
the input mix, and operate with less scale economies than their adult counterparts.
Finally, this study has some limitations. First, the quality-adjusted patient visits
measure is the ratio of CPT codes of the share of total procedures that comprise more
direct interaction between the physical therapists and patients. However, these specific
CPT codes were identified by operations managers (most commonly physical therapists)
for the purposes of internal tracking quality of physical therapist care. This quality ratio
is reasonably exogenous, though, due to numerous governing requirements. Moreover,
the number of observations for pediatric clinics is limited, relative to those for adult
facilities. Second, while consisting of over 4,000 observations across 27 U.S. states, the
facilities studied are managed by one industry-leading healthcare provider.
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Chapter 4: Do-Not-Resuscitate: Patient, Hospital, and Socio-Economic Characteristics
Associated with Active DNR Orders in an Inpatient Hospital Setting 12
1.1 Introduction
The Do Not Resuscitate order, or DNR as it is often referred, expresses the will of
the patient to avoid continued medical intervention in the face of a life-threatening crisis.
In some countries, such as the UK, the term DNAR, for Do Not Attempt Resuscitation is
preferred to reflect the cold reality that attempts to resuscitate a patient may or may not
succeed. Another frequently seen alternative for DNR is the term, Allow for Natural
Death (Vennemen et al, 2008). Whichever term is used, the decision made by the patient
is the same: The DNR order states that resuscitation should not be attempted on a patient
should the patient suffer respiratory or cardiac arrest.
It is reasonable to hypothesize, given many people sign a DNR while undergoing
medical treatment in a hospital setting, that a patient’s understanding of mortality risk
involved should influence a decision to have a standing DNR order. It is also likely that
additional demographic, socioeconomic, and hospital characteristics carry a degree of
power in this choice. Identifying the factors that influence the DNR choice, along with
the intensity of their influences, has the potential to aid healthcare professionals in
understanding potential impacts on a patient’s preferences towards resuscitation attempts.
The purpose of this research is to identify these variables and account for the degree of
influence through the use of all hospital inpatient discharge records for Tennessee in
2008, the first year the DNR variable was added to the hospital discharge dataset.
1

This work was completed under the supervision and direction of Dr. Cyril F. Chang.
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An earlier version of this research was presented at both the 86 th Annual Western Economic Association
International Conference in San Diego, CA, and the 8th World Congress on Health Economics in Toronto,
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The national standard uniform bill (UB) form is meant to seamlessly reconcile
paper hospital forms with electronic standards. Replacing the UB-92 form, the UB-04
created a more efficient standard to allow for alternative data recording and was formally
implemented in 2007. In an effort to continue efficient uniform reporting across a
national standard, the DNR record has begun being added to the UB-04 form, though
states have incorporated its usage at different speeds and captured it in different manners.
Some states, such as Maryland, did not implement its usage until 2009. The data utilized
for this study represents the first full year of this new record for the state of Tennessee.
This field carries great potential in understanding the impact certain factors have on a
patient’s desires, allowing for the first large-scale research into this area. However, there
are certain limitations due to available data on possible exogenous variables not captured
in hospital inpatient discharge datasets. To correct for some limitations, the author
utilizes not only over 800,000 hospital inpatient discharge records from Tennessee for
2008, but also incorporate hospital characteristics from the Joint Annual Report –
Hospitals (JAR-H) dataset (Tennessee Department of Health. 2008) and certain countylevel socioeconomic characteristics from the Area Resource File (U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services. 2008).
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: Section II reviews the relevant
literature, section II defines the theoretical model and data, section IV discusses the
empirical estimation procedure and results, and section V provides concluding remarks.
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2.1 Previous Literature
Literature exploring the influential factors of Do-Not-Resuscitate orders within
inpatient hospital settings has been limited due to the availability of data. Nursing homes
have been given some attention, as authors have been able to utilize the nursing home
component of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survery. For instance, facility and county
characteristics have been shown to indeed play a role in the decision process as well
(Troyer, McAuley. 2006). Additional studies have examined similar influential factors
for advanced directives within nursing home settings. For instance, minorities have been
demonstrated to have lower likelihoods of possessing a DNR directive (Degenholtz et al.
2002). Further, reduced time spent within the facilities was found to be correlated with
possession of advanced care directives (McAuley, Travis. 2003).
In 2008, as part of a multi-institution Coping with Cancer study examining
advanced care planning for patients with advanced cancer, white patients were found to
be more likely to have a DNR order than minority patients (Smith et al, 2008). This
coincided with a previous study surveying 30 hospitals in the Cleveland metropolitan
area, 29 of which were non-profit hospitals (Shepardson et al, 1999). Similar studies
have found that not only are white patients more likely to possess a DNR, but women are
also more likely, while additionally demonstrating the effect of other diagnosis severity,
patient demographic, and hospital characteristics on DNR utilization (Wenger et al, 1995)
(Wenger et al, 1997). This is further confirmed through a 2006 study regarding end-oflife-care (Duffy et al. 2006). Drawing from these initial findings using relatively small
samples of mostly survey data, the author built an appropriate model to test the effects of
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patient, hospital, and socio-economic characteristics on the probability that a hospitalized
patient has a DNR, using a more robust hospital patient discharge dataset.
While the American Medical Association allows for the patient’s family, or an
alternative appropriate decision-maker such as the physician, to make a decision to
activate a DNR directive (AMA 1991), research has shown that patients may lack
complete awareness regarding the process (Bedell et al. 1986) but wish to be involved in
making major decisions such as these (Mansell et al. 2000). Previous studies, using a
one-year single-hospital retrospective dataset, have also indicated that physician specialty
can carry significant sway on not only the decision to sign a DNR, but also the timing
(Morrell et al, 2008). It is important to keep these aspects in perspective when
researching the cause and effect of DNR orders.
The research presented here, while acknowledging this, also recognizes that,
according to the AMA guidelines, any alternative decision maker is expected to make
such a choice in the best interest, and consistent with the wishes, of the patient (Burns et
al. 2003). The findings presented here are the first, to the knowledge of the author, to
exploit a comprehensive, large-scale database of hospital inpatient discharge records to
analyze potentially powerful diagnosis and patient-demographic characteristics, while
also controlling for hospital and county-level socio-economic influences, regarding the
impact on the utilization of Do-Not-Resuscitate directives.

92

3.1 Theoretical Model & Data
3.2 Probit Model
The primary variable of interest in the study is the DNR indicator, taking a value
of 1 for those patients with an active DNR order and 0 otherwise. Thus, a Probit model is
used to evaluate the effects of a host of explanatory variables chosen based on both
theoretical consideration and examples from previous studies on a patient’s probability of
signing such a directive. The model is specified below, capturing the probability of an
active DNR for individual i, given the individual’s demographic, medical, hospital, and
county characteristics, Xi.
Pr (Yi = 1 | Xi) = Φ(Xiβ)

(1)

The term β represents a vector of parameters of Xi, while Φ represents the
cumulative normal distribution function. From the estimated coefficients, ̂ , we then
compute the mean marginal effects estimates for, respectively, the continuous and binary
variables included in the Probit model. For continuous variables, the marginal effects are
calculated using:
Mi = ̂ k ( ̅ ̂ ),

(2)

where  is the normal probability density function and ̅ is the mean value of X over the
dataset. For binary variables, the marginal effect a change in value of 0 to 1 is measured
as:
Mi = Φ(xi1 ̂ ) - Φ(xi0 ̂ )

(3)
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where xi1 indicates a value of 1 for the binary variable of interest and xi0 indicates a value
of 0 for the binary variable of interest.
3.3 Data
Certain demographic variables should help provide explanatory power towards
the decision to sign a DNR form. It is likely that age, gender, and ethnicity all have an
impact, as these variables have all been well-documented to be significant influences on
many other healthcare decisions. Further, we examine the impact that insurance status
carries on the likelihood of an active DNR order. The data utilized, the Tennessee
Hospital Discharge Data Set (HDDS), is a rich, comprehensive dataset for all patients
discharged from a hospital in Tennessee for 2008. It contains hospital specific
identifiers, as well as relevant patient specific information. Demographic variables
include age, gender, and race. Additionally, the primary insurance carriers, patient
diagnosis, zip code, and severity and mortality risk scores are captured within the patient
discharge data. Also, DNR status, the primary variable of interest, is given. The sample
is then restricted to adult residents of Tennessee ages 18 and over, leaving the total
number of observations at 594,348.
Hospital and socio-economic traits have also been demonstrated as relevant to
advanced directive utilization. Hence, to account for these impactful variables, these
traits are merged to patient discharge data according to the hospital identifier and patient
zip code for each observation. The Joint Annual Report for hospitals (JAR-H), issued by
the Tennessee Department of Health, was utilized to tie hospital characteristics to the
discharge data, including ownership type and number of beds. Additionally, county-level
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socio-economic traits were taken from the Area Resource File, published by the United
States Census Bereau, to capture median income levels, percentage of high school
graduates, percentage in poverty, percentage of population who are white, and a
continuous measure of the population density to indicate the level of urban/rural status
with a value of 1 indicating highly urban and 8 indicating highly rural. Finally, the
religious adherence rates per 1,000 people are taken for each county from the Religious
Congregations and Membership Study (Association of Statisticians of American
Religious Bodies. 2000), properly adjusted for possible undercounting of certain religious
groups and minorities (Finke, Scheitle. 2005).
In Table 1 below, we are able to identify differences within key variables that
could potentially affect the decision to sign a DNR order.
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Table 1: Variable Mean Values
Variable
Patient
Characteristics

Insurance

Hospital
Characteristics

State Region

County
Characteristics

All Patients
N=594,348
57.7

DNR Patients
N=12,529
67.1

Male
Female
White
Non-White
Over 65
Under 65
Mortality Risk
Severity
Medicare
TennCare
(Medicaid)
Commercial
Other Ins
Uninsured
For Profit

39.2%
60.8%
71.6%
28.4%
42.4%
57.5%
1.7
2.1
51.4%
14.3%

43.4%
56.6%
83.2%
16.8%
61.2%
38.4%
2.1
2.4
65.6%
8.4%

25.1%
8.9%
0.3%
26.5%

16.2%
8.3%
1.5%
11.5%

Non-Profit
Public
Beds
West TN
Middle TN
East TN
% HS Diploma

53.9%
19.6%
350.3
25.5%
37.0%
37.6%
75.1

57.6%
30.9%
325.8
2.0%
59.9%
38.1%
76.2

% Poverty
% White
Rural / Urban
Median Income
Adherence Rate

16.0
81.7
3.0
$ 43,404.23
641.1

15.6
85.9
2.8
$ 44,251.97
633.3

Age

As shown, while the average age of all adult patients is 57.7, the average age of an
adult patient with an active DNR is 67.1. In addition, while male patients account for
39.2% of the dataset, 43.4% of DNR patients are male. Patients with DNR orders also
have higher average severity and mortality risk scores, as determined through the usage
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of All Patient Refined – Diagnosis Related Groups (APR-DRG), as would be expected.
Furthermore, the gap between white and non-white patients is much greater for DNR
patients. While white patients make up 71.6% of the sample, they account for 83.2% of
all DNR patients.
Medicare patients make up almost 66% of DNR patients, while only comprising a
little more than 51% of all patients. This coincides with the increased average age of this
patient base. Commercially insured and those with TennCare (Medicaid), however,
represent a significantly lower percentage of DNR patients than those without. Persons
without insurance comprised only 0.3% of the total sample, while accounting for 1.5% of
all DNR patients. Further, the percentage of patients in for-profit hospitals is much
smaller when restricting the sample to DNR patients only, while the percentage of
patients in public hospitals is then much larger. DNR patients appear to be more often
located in smaller hospitals, as determined by the number of beds.
Within the state, there are significant regional discrepancies, as well as between
counties. Patients with active DNR orders, on average, reside in counties with larger
percentages of high school graduates and white residents, and also greater median
incomes. Moreover, they are also associated with counties possessing lower poverty
levels and religious adherence rates.
4.1 Empirical Results
4.2 Whole Sample Analysis
As illustrated in Table 2, the average DNR patient displays significant differences
in patient, hospital, and socio-economic characteristics from their non-DNR counterparts.
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Age represents the age of the patient. Male serves as a dummy variable where a value of
1 is given for male patients, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, White is a proxy for
race/ethnicity where a value of 1 represents white patients, and all other races/ethnicities
receive a value of 0. Each insurance category is assigned a value of 1 if the patient falls
into that category, and zero otherwise, with the exception of commercial insurance
patients who are utilized as the comparison group. Rural/Urban is a continuous variable
representing the degree of population density, with 1 representing a highly dense
population and 8 representing a very rural area. Median Income represents the median
income of the patient’s county of residence (in $10,000’s). A second model is also
tested, including possible interaction effects between insurance and median income
levels. Both models, while not shown, include hospital specific clustering effects and
controls for patient comorbidity (Elixhauser et al. 1998)3. The mean marginal effects are
presented below in Table 2:

3

Of the twenty-seven patient comorbidity measures used, twenty were found to be statistically significant
at the 5% level or better for both models. This aligns with previous research indicating potential influence
from physician specialty (Morrell et al, 2008).
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Table 2: Mean Marginal Effects
Variable
Patient
Characteristics

Insurance

State Region
Hospital
Characteristics

County
Characteristics

Income/Insurance
Interactions

Age

Model 1:
(No Interactions)
0.0004*

Model 2:
W/Interactions
0.0005*

White
Male
Severity Score
Mortality Risk
TennCare
Medicare
Uninsured
Other Ins
Middle TN
West TN
Public

0.0123*
0.0013*
0.0006***
0.0033*
0.0026*
-0.0003
0.0348*
0.0069*
0.0238*
-0.0253*
0.0083*

0.0132*
0.0014*
0.0006***
0.0034*
-0.0262*
-0.0119*
0.0935**
-0.0196*
0.0237*
-0.0252*
0.0082*

For Profit
Beds
Median Income

-0.0307*
>-0.0001*
-0.0046*

-0.0307*
>-0.0001*
-0.0069*

Rural/Urban
% White
% Poverty
% HS Diploma
Adherence Rate
Median
Income*Uninsured
Median
Income*Medicare
Median
Income*TennCare
Median
Income*Other
Insurance

-0.0016*
0.0007*
0.0031*
0.0025*
<-0.0001*

-0.0016*
0.0007*
0.0032*
0.0025*
<-0.0001*
-0.0124*
0.0026*
0.0065*
0.0059*

*1%, **5%, ***10%

In the first model, all variables are found to be statistically significant with the
exception of one. In this model, Medicare patients do not appear to be statistically
different than patients with commercial insurance in their decision process. However,
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after including for interactions between insurance and median income levels, all variables
have a statistically significant impact on the likelihood of a patient possessing an active
DNR directive. Further, the coefficient estimates obtained for all other variables, other
than median income and insurance types, are relatively stable between the two models.
However, the estimates do significantly change for the insurance types and median
income with the inclusion of their interactions. This is expected, as median income levels
would most likely have differing effects on patients with different insurance coverage.
All else equal, increases in median incomes decrease the likelihood of a DNR.
But, as seen in the second model, the effect is altered depending on insurance coverage.
For instance, Medicare and TennCare (Medicaid) patients demonstrate a significantly
reduced likelihood of an active DNR order than their commercially insured counterparts.
TennCare coverage reduces this probability by approximately 2 percentage points, while
Medicare coverage demonstrates a smaller, though still significant, reduction of
approximately 0.9 percentage points. The effect stemming from type of insurance
coverage is most pronounced, and in contrast to all other patients with some form of
insurance coverage, for uninsured patients, as they are over 8 percentage points more
likely to have a DNR than those with commercial insurance, all else equal. However, the
likelihood for this patient base decreases as median income levels increase, though the
interaction effect is the opposite for insured patients. This suggests that a patient’s ability
to pay possibly carries an inverse relationship with the choice to have an active DNR
directive within an inpatient hospital environment, though further research is needed in
this matter.

100

Consistent with previous research, white patients are more likely than non-white
patients, and older patients are more likely than younger patients, to have an active DNR
order. Though, in contrast to some previous studies within nursing homes, male patients
are found to be more likely than female patients. As expected, the likelihood increases as
the APR-DRG severity and mortality risk scores increase. There are also significant
regional differences, along with impacting county level traits. Those in more rural
counties are less likely, while those with greater percentage of high school graduates are
more likely. Also, religious adherence rates exhibit a statistically significant inverse
relationship with DNR likelihood, though the effect is relatively small. Finally, we see
that patients in for-profit hospitals are significantly less likely to choose a DNR directive
than those in non-profit hospitals, while patients residing in public hospitals were
significantly less likely.
4.3 Subsample Analysis
To further explore how these factors possibly impact patients differently
depending on certain characteristics, we divided the dataset into multiple sub-groups. In
Table 3 below, the patients are separated based on ethnicity. White patients in public
hospitals are not statistically different in their possession of a DNR than their
counterparts in non-profit hospitals. However, those white patients in for-profit hospitals
were approximately 3.4 percentage points less likely to have an active DNR. Similar
results for the influence of hospital ownership type are found for non-white patients,
though less pronounced as for-profit hospital patients are approximately 1.1 percentage
points less likely than their non-profit counterparts. Further, while males are more likely
to possess a DNR than females among white patients, gender doesn’t appear to carry
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statistically significant explanatory power in the choice for non-white patients.
Additionally, uninsured non-white patients are not statistically different than their
commercially insured equivalents, while being uninsured increases the probability of an
active DNR order among white patients by more than 8 percentage points. Finally, while
the severity score has a positive influence on the likelihood for white patients, it causes
no statistically significant effect for non-white patients.
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Table 3: By Ethnicity

Patient
Characteristics

Insurance

State Region
Hospital
Characteristics

County
Characteristics

Income/Insurance
Interactions

Variable

Model 3:
(White Patients)
N=425,365

Age

0.0007*

Model 4:
(Non-White
Patients)
N=168,983
0.0001*

Male
Severity Score
Mortality Risk
TennCare
Medicare
Uninsured
Other Ins
Middle TN
West TN
Public

0.0019*
0.0007*
0.0040*
-0.0187*
-0.0137*
0.0924**
-0.0216*
0.0235*
-0.0213*
-0.0008

-0.0002
0.0003
0.0016*
-0.0188**
-0.0253*
0.0141
-0.0171**
0.0155*
-0.0199*
0.0164*

For Profit
Beds
Median Income

-0.0337*
>-0.0001*
-0.0081*

-0.0111*
>-0.0001*
-0.0074*

Rural/Urban
% White
% Poverty
% HS Diploma
Adherence Rate
Median
Income*Uninsured
Median
Income*Medicare
Median
Income*TennCare
Median
Income*Other
Insurance

-0.0009*
0.0012*
0.0029*
0.0027*
>-0.0001***
-0.0109**

-0.0040*
0.0004*
0.0030*
0.0021*
>-0.0001*
-0.0015

0.0024*

0.0057*

0.0024***

0.0046*

0.0054*

0.0047*

*1%, **5%, ***10%

In Table 4, we examine the effects these variables have on patients by gender.
The severity score doesn’t carry explanatory power for the decision process for male
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patients, though it increases the likelihood for females. Additionally, the impact of being
uninsured is much more prominent for males than females, as males see an increase in
likelihood of over 11.5 percentage points, compared to an increase of approximately 5
percentage points for females. Additionally, males seem to see a greater decrease in
probability of a DNR while patients at a for-profit hospital, while females demonstrate a
greater decrease in likelihood with higher median income levels.
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Table 4: By Gender
Variable

Patient
Characteristics

Insurance

State Region
Hospital
Characteristics

County
Characteristics

Income/Insurance
Interactions

Age

Model 5:
(Male)
N=233,188
0.0004*

Model 6:
(Female)
N=361,230
0.0005*

White
Severity Score
Mortality Risk
TennCare
Medicare
Uninsured
Other Ins
Middle TN
West TN
Public

0.0168*
0.0002
0.0037*
-0.0298*
-0.0131*
0.1378*
-0.0220*
0.0259*
-0.0253*
0.0094*

0.0111*
0.0007***
0.0032*
-0.0233*
-0.0115*
0.0536**
-0.0187*
0.0223*
-0.0257*
0.0071*

For Profit
Beds
Median Income

-0.0361*
>-0.0001*
-0.0061*

-0.0274*
>-0.0001*
-0.0077*

Rural/Urban
% White
% Poverty
% HS Diploma
Adherence Rate
Median
Income*Uninsured
Median
Income*Medicare
Median
Income*TennCare
Median
Income*Other
Insurance

-0.0015*
0.0007*
0.0035*
0.0026*
>-0.0001*
-0.0221*

-0.0016*
0.0007*
0.0030*
0.0024*
>-0.0001*
-0.0037

0.0023*

0.0029*

0.0053*

0.0069*

0.0055*

0.0064*

*1%, **5%, ***10%

Lastly, the sample is divided into sub-groups for each insurance category, as
presented in Table 5. As shown, ethnicity and gender have a positive and significant
impact on the likelihood of a DNR for commercially insured patients, while neither is
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statistically significant for TennCare or uninsured patients. For Medicare patients, while
gender doesn’t have a statistically significant impact, ethnicity carries greater sway on the
decision for this patient group relative to patients of other insurance coverage categories.
Medicare patients also demonstrated a greater likelihood with increases in age,
severity score, and mortality risk than all other patients. However, hospital ownership
type has the greatest impact on uninsured patients. Those in public hospitals are over 36
percentage points more likely to have an active DNR directive than those in a non-profit
hospital, while those in for-profit hospital settings are more than 13 percentage points less
likely. Finally, uninsured patients are also impacted by median income levels to a greater
extent than those patients with insurance, as increases in median income levels of
$10,000 decrease the likelihood by more than 16 percentage points.
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Table 5: By Insurance
Variable

Patient
Characteristics

State Region
Hospital
Characteristics

Age
White
Male
Severity
Score
Mortality
Risk
Middle TN
West TN
Public

For Profit
Beds
County
Median
Characteristics
Income
Rural/Urban
% White
% Poverty
% HS
Diploma
Adherence
Rate
*1%, **5%, ***10%

Model 7:
(TennCare)
N=85,219
0.0001*

Model 8:
(Medicare)
N=305,656
0.0006*

Model 9:
(Commercial)
N=149,287
0.0004*

Model 10:
(Uninsured)
N=1,392
0.0012

Model 11:
(Other)
N=52,794
0.0004*

-0.0001
-0.0001
0.0003*

0.0308*
-0.0003
0.0011**

0.0098*
0.0045*
-0.0002

0.0102
0.0101
0.0121

0.0035*
0.0012
0.0005

0.0005*

0.0044*

0.0023*

-0.0172

0.0031*

0.0048*
-0.0035*
0.0040*

0.0278*
-0.0267*
-0.0044*

0.0133*
-0.0112*
0.0056*

0.0115
<0.0001
0.3686*

0.0233*
-0.0289*
0.0186*

-0.0031*
>-0.0001*
>-0.0001

-0.0311*
>-0.0001*
-0.0062*

-0.0250*
>-0.0001*
-0.0027*

-0.1326*
-0.0004*
-0.162**

-0.0414*
>-0.0001*
-0.0073*

-0.0002921*
>0.00001
0.0005*
0.0002*

-0.0015*
0.0014*
0.0028*
0.0027*

>-0.0001
0.0006*
0.0025*
0.0018*

-0.0119
0.0106*
0.0001
0.0130***

-0.0025*
0.0004*
0.0039*
0.0035*

-0.0001*

<0.0001

<0.0001

-0.0001

-0.0001*

5.1 Conclusions
While acknowledging an inability to account for all potentially explanatory
variables, research into this decision making process with a large, comprehensive dataset
provides a greater understanding of such a pivotal decision-making process within an
inpatient hospital setting. Among the key findings of this research, it is shown that,
consistent with previous research, patient age has a positive impact on the likelihood of
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possessing an active DNR order while in the hospital. Further, white patients are more
likely than non-white patients, though male patients, contrary to some previous studies,
have a higher probability of a DNR directive than females. Being uninsured has the most
powerful effect, all else equal. Additionally, the negative impact from median income
levels on DNR likelihood is most pronounced for uninsured patients. Finally, relative to
non-profit hospitals, patients within public hospitals are significantly less likely to have a
DNR, while those in for-profit facilities carry a greater probability.
Further study is clearly needed to attempt controls for additional variables of
potential interest, such as family environment, as well as the impact the decision has on
patient outcomes. Utilizing the results from this and future studies, healthcare
professionals may gain greater awareness of patient desires for aid in policy
interventions, such as patient counseling.
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Chapter 5: Do Active Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders Impact Patient Health and Healthcare
Outcomes within Inpatient Hospital Settings?12
1.1 Introduction
A Do-Not-Resuscitate (DNR) order is a legal advanced directive that expresses a
patient’s desire to avoid intubation and resuscitation attempts should the patient suffer a
cardiac or respiratory arrest. A possible misconception about DNR is that it causes the
patient with such an expressed wish to stop receiving appropriate care; it does not as how
the DNR laws and regulation are currently structured in most states. Therefore, while
the DNR order may potentially impact health outcomes it should not affect the medical
care a patient receives while in the hospital, but this has not been empirically
substantiated. This research will investigate if a patient’s treatment is impacted by
possession of an active DNR directive, as well as the order’s effect on health outcomes
while in the hospital.
For processing hospital claims electronically by hospitals and third-party payers,
the national standard uniform bill form (or the UB form for short) has been used as a
single, standardized billing form since 1984. In 2007, the UB-92 form adopted in 1992
was replaced by the UB-04 form, which created a more effective model to allow for
unconventional data recording. Recently, the DNR record has begun being added to the
UB-04 form, though states have begun implementing this new field using different
methods and in different time frames. With this addition to patient discharge data,
research may now be conducted into the cause and effect of DNR orders through the
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exploitation of a rich, comprehensive hospital patient discharge dataset. Though there are
certain limitations due to available data on possible exogenous variables not captured in
hospital inpatient discharge datasets, this may be accounted for by employing additional
data such as hospital characteristics from the Joint Annual Report of Hospitals (JAR-H)
dataset (Tennessee Department of Health. 2008) and certain county-level socioeconomic
characteristics from the Area Resource File, published by the United States Census
Bureau.
In previous research (Lubiani et al. 2012), using a comprehensive hospital patient
discharge dataset for the state of Tennessee, examined key patient, hospital, and socioeconomic characteristics associated with patients possessing an active DNR directive
within an inpatient hospital setting. Expanding on this and replicating and utilizing the
previously obtained Probit estimates, the present study investigates the effects of DNR
orders on patient treatment outcomes. The purpose of this research is to provide the first
large-scale research into these effects, specifically the impact DNR directives might have
on a patient’s length of stay in the hospital, treatment received while in the hospital, and
in-hospital patient mortality.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: Section II reviews the relevant literature,
section III defines the theoretical model and data, section IV discusses the empirical
estimation techniques with results, and section V provides concluding remarks.
2.1 Previous Literature
Previous research examining the powerful influences on patient choice regarding
Do-Not-Resuscitate directives within inpatient hospital settings has been hindered due to
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limited data availability. These studies have historically been restricted to a relatively
small number of location and patient observations. For instance, in 1999, in an analysis
encompassing 30 hospitals in the Cleveland metropolitan area, of which 29 were nonprofit hospitals, found white patients admitted from a stroke to be more likely to possess
a DNR order than minority patients (Shepardson et al, 1999). Related studies have
illustrated similar findings on the impact patient ethnicity carries on the likelihood of
possessing an active DNR, while also demonstrating women to also be more likely, as
well as indicating the potential influences of assorted patient demographic and hospital
characteristics on DNR usage (Wenger et al, 1995) (Wenger et al, 1997). This is
additionally established through a 2006 study examining end-of-life-care (Duffy et al.
2006). Building from these previous findings based upon relatively small samples, the
authors established mean marginal effects estimates, derived from Probit estimation, for
patient, hospital, and socio-economic characteristics that impact the likelihood a
hospitalized patient has a DNR, exploiting a more robust hospital inpatient discharge
dataset.
The American Medical Association (AMA) permits a patient’s family, or an
alternative suitable decision-maker, such as the presiding medical doctor, to initiate a
DNR order (AMA 1991). However, research has shown that patients may not have a
complete understanding of the process (Bedell et al. 1986), even while desiring greater
participation in these decision-making processes (Mansell et al. 2000). Furthermore, in a
one-year single-hospital retrospective analysis, researchers found physician specialties to
be potentially influential in the decision to sign, and timing of, a DNR (Morrell et al,
2008). However, others have argued against the merits of physician involvement in
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discussions of the implementation of Do-Not-Resuscitate directives, stating the
possibility of it providing more harm than good (Manisy, et al. 2003). The following
analysis, while recognizing these potential effects, also takes note of AMA guidelines
stating that any alternative decision maker is expected to make such a choice in the best
interest, and consistent with the wishes, of the patient (Burns et al. 2003).
Though examinations of DNR orders for patients within inpatient hospital settings
have historically relied on limited data, related studies have been able to utilize larger
sample sizes through analysis of the nursing homes, mostly through employing the
nursing home component of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, conducted by the
U.S. Census Bureau. One such study found minorities to demonstrate lower likelihoods
of possessing a DNR directive (Degenholtz et al. 2002). Additional research of nursing
homes found that reduced time spent within the facilities was found to be correlated with
possession of advanced care directives (McAuley and Travis 2003). Finally, facility and
county traits have been shown to be significantly correlated with utilization of advance
directives, such as the DNR order (Troyer and McAuley 2006).
The following research evaluates the average treatment effect (ATE) and average
treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of Do-Not-Resuscitate orders on in-hospital patient
mortality, patient length of stay in the hospital, and total gross charges as a measure of
the intensity of medical treatment while in the hospital. Previous studies, using more
limited data, have analyzed the effect of DNR orders through various matching methods
(Bedell, et al. 1986) (Chen, et al. 2008) (Shepardson et al. 1999). However, extensive
research has shown certain matching estimators to be potentially biased and / or
inconsistent (Dehejia and Wahba 1999; Heckman and Ichimura 1998; Glazerman et al.
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2003). Therefore, care was taken in choosing an appropriate matching estimation to
ensure equal percent bias reducing estimates (Rubin. 1976a) (Rubin. 1976b). Presented
are estimates obtained through Mahalanobis metric matching within calipers based on
propensity scores (Rubin. 1980) (Rosenbaum, Rubin. 1985).
The findings are the first, to the knowledge of the authors, to exploit a
comprehensive, large-scale database of hospital inpatient discharge records to analyze
potentially powerful diagnosis and patient-demographic characteristics, while also
controlling for hospital and county-level socio-economic influences, regarding the impact
on the use of Do-Not-Resuscitate directives.
3.1 Theoretical Model & Data
3.2 Probit Model
The authors derive both the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) and the
average treatment effect (ATE) for multiple health and healthcare outcome measures
through Mahalanobis metric matching within calipers defined by the propensity score.
The ATT captures the effect of DNR directives on the patients who had active DNR
orders. The ATE, though, captures effect a DNR would have, on average, on any patient
within the sample. To measure both of these, the Probit model is first appraised to derive
appropriate propensity scores for the matching estimation. The analysis is conducted to
evaluate, specifically, the ATE from Do-Not-Resuscitate orders. As such, the dependent
variable for the Probit model is the DNR indicator, taking a value of 1 for those patients
with an active DNR order and 0 otherwise. Thus, the Probit model is exploited to
estimate the likelihood of possession for a patient for the DNR directive, dependent on
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variables chosen due to both their theoretical consideration and significance in related
literature. The model is specified below, capturing the probability of an active DNR for
individual i, given the individual’s demographic, medical, hospital, and county
characteristics, Xi.
Pr (Yi = 1 | Xi) = Φ(Xiβ)

(1)

The term β represents a vector of parameters of Xi, while Φ represents the cumulative
normal distribution function. From the estimated coefficients, ̂ , we then compute the
mean marginal effects estimates, calculated for continuous variables as
Mi = ̂ k ( ̅ ̂ ),

(2)

where  is the normal probability density function and ̅ is the mean value of X over the
dataset. For binary independent variables, the marginal effect a change in value of 0 to 1
is measured as
Mi = Φ(xi1 ̂ ) - Φ(xi0 ̂ )

(3)

where xi1 indicates a value of 1 for the binary variable of interest and xi0 indicates a value
of 0 for the binary variable of interest.
3.3 Mahalanobis Metric Matching
If patients possessing a DNR are not statistically different in any other aspect than
those patients without a DNR, then the use of the DNR variable in various regression
models would provide a coefficient estimate indicative of the ATE and ATT. However,
in the absence of this extreme case, such modeling would provide misleading estimates of
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the ATE. To correct for this issue, matching has become a common approach to
estimating the ATE and ATT within medicine and economics. However, there are
numerous matching techniques available for such estimation. The authors choose
Mahalanobis metric matching within calipers defined by the propensity score, as it is
equal percent bias reducing (EPBR) under commonly assumed distributional conditions
(Rubin. 1976; 1980). Using a weighted distribution of covariances for distance, this
method matches each DNR patient to a group of non-DNR patients within the distances
based on the propensity score obtained from Probit modeling, and then matches as
closely as possible, based on the characteristic variables within the model, the patient
with a DNR to a patient without a DNR within that group. The two grouped patients are
then excluded from future pairings, and the process is repeated until all DNR patients
have been matched with a non-DNR patient. This allows for estimation of differences in
outcomes across each matched pair to provide the ATT and ATE. The Mahalanobis
distance is defined below:
d(u,v) = (

)

(

)

(4)

Additionally, as this is a frequently utilized powerful matching method, it is
readily available in many statistical software packages. For this study, the authors
utilized the “psmatch2” program within STATA (Leuven, Sianesi. 2003). This command
allows for various matching methods, including Mahalanobis metric matching, while also
first deriving the Probit model and propensity score estimates. While the psmatch2
STATA procedure, with Mahalanobis metric matching within calipers defined by the
propensity score options, simplifies the method, the first step taken must be to randomly
order the sample. To ensure randomness in pairing the patients, the authors generated,
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and then sorted on, a random variable with uniform distribution between 0 and 1. The
program then performs caliper matching on the propensity score for each patient
“treated” with a DNR order with all available “untreated” patients, then matches each
treated patient with an untreated counterpart within the caliper who is closest in terms of
the Mahalanobis distance (Rosenbaum, Rubin. 1985).
3.4 Data
The primary goal of this study is to evaluate potential impacts of Do-NotResuscitate orders on health and healthcare outcomes. Specifically, the authors measure
the ATE of DNR orders on in-hospital death, length of stay while in the hospital, and
total gross charges as a proxy for healthcare provision to patients. To obtain this ATE, a
Probit model is estimated to first capture the likelihood that a patient possesses a DNR
directive. Stemming from previously discussed theory and literature, patient
characteristics, such as age, gender, ethnicity, and type of insurance coverage, influence
the decision to sign a DNR form. The data employed, the Tennessee Hospital Discharge
Data Set (HDDS), is a comprehensive dataset for all patients discharged from hospital
inpatient care in Tennessee for 2008. It also carries diagnosis information, severity and
mortality risk scores, and DNR status for each patient. Further, we are able to identify
the patient’s county of residence and discharge status. The discharge status is used to
identify those patients who died while in the hospital. Further, the dataset includes length
of patient stay, as well as total gross (unadjusted) charges. The total gross charges are
taken as an indication of patient treatment. As DNR directives don’t prevent treatment
other than forms of resuscitation, total gross charges are used as an outcome variable of
the treatment to examine if patients possibly receive different treatment than their non120

DNR counterparts. Finally, the sample is then restricted to adult residents of Tennessee
ages 18 and over, leaving the total number of observations at 594,348.
Hospital and socio-economic characteristics have been revealed as relevant to the
likelihood of DNR orders, as also discussed previously. Therefore, hospital
characteristics, such as the number of beds, from the Joint Annual Report for hospitals
(JAR-H), issued by the Tennessee Department of Health, were merged with the discharge
data. Also, socio-economic traits were taken at the county level from the Area Resource
File, published by the United States Census Bereau, to capture median income levels,
percentage of high school graduates, percentage in poverty, percentage of population who
are white, and a continuous measure of the population density to indicate the level of
urban/rural status with a value of 1 indicating highly urban and 8 indicating highly rural.
Lastly, the religious adherence rates per 1,000 people for each county, as indicated by the
Religious Congregations and Membership Study (Association of Statisticians of
American Religious Bodies. 2000), were merged with the data, having been properly
adjusted for possible undercounting of certain religious groups and minorities (Finke,
Scheitle. 2005).
In Table 1 below, we are able to identify differences within key variables that
could potentially affect the decision to sign a DNR order.
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Table 1: Variable Mean Values
Variable
Health & Healthcare
Outcomes

Patient
Characteristics

Insurance

Hospital
Characteristics

State Region

County
Characteristics

In-Hospital Death

Non-DNR Patients
N=581,819
2.44%

DNR Patients
N=12,529
7.98%

Length of Stay
Gross Charges
Age

4.68
$26,595.28
57.7

5.04
$26,486..39
67.1

Male
Female
White
Non-White
Over 65
Under 65
Mortality Risk
Severity
Medicare
TennCare
(Medicaid)
Commercial
Other Ins
Uninsured
For Profit

39.2%
60.8%
71.6%
28.4%
42.4%
57.5%
1.7
2.1
51.4%
14.3%

43.4%
56.6%
83.2%
16.8%
61.2%
38.4%
2.1
2.4
65.6%
8.4%

25.1%
8.9%
0.3%
26.5%

16.2%
8.3%
1.5%
11.5%

Non-Profit
Public
Beds
West TN
Middle TN
East TN
% HS Diploma

53.9%
19.6%
350.3
25.5%
37.0%
37.6%
75.1

57.6%
30.9%
325.8
2.0%
59.9%
38.1%
76.2

% Poverty
% White
Rural / Urban
Median Income
Adherence Rate

16.0
81.7
3.0
$43,404.23
641.1

15.6
85.9
2.8
$44,251.97
633.3

Of particular interest for this study are the health and healthcare outcomes for those
patients with active DNR directives, and for those without. Due to the nature of the DNR
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directive, patients possessing one are expected to have a higher rate of death in the
hospital and, as such, a shorter length of stay in the hospital. Further, as previously
stated, the DNR order should not interfere with patient treatment other than CPR or
intubation. Therefore, DNR patients shouldn’t be expected to have significant
differences in total gross charges, as this is a measure of total healthcare treatment. As
illustrated in Table 1, 7.98% of DNR patients died while in the hospital. In contrast, only
2.44% of patients without a DNR experienced in-hospital death. Interestingly, the
average length of stay is longer for DNR patients, 5.04 to 4.68 patient days, before
controlling for other factors. Lastly, as an indicator of patient care, total gross charges for
patients with a DNR order are not statistically different than those for patients without a
DNR order. However, examining differences in mean outcomes represents possible bias
since the two patient bases are not identical, as seen by the mean values of patient,
hospital, and socio-economic characteristics.
4.1 Empirical Results
4.2 Entire Sample
To capture the ATE of Do-Not-Resuscitate orders, the propensity scores are first
estimated through Probit estimation. To accomplish this, the authors replicate the model
presented in previous research (Lubiani, et al. 2012), incorporating interaction effects of
median incomes and type of insurance coverage. Mahalanobis metric matching within
calipers using propensity scores then allows us to estimate the ATT and ATE. The
results for the entire sample are presented in Table 2 below:
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Table 2: ATT and ATE for Entire Patient Dataset
Likelihood of Death Length of Stay
ATT
3.55%*
-0.273*
ATE
3.78%*
0.048*
*1%, **5%,
***10%

Gross Charges
$206.32
$7,066.34

As shown, the ATE of active Do-Not-Resuscitate orders within inpatient settings
on the likelihood of dying while in the hospital is an increase of 3.78%. Further, while
the ATE on the length of stay is statistically significant, it is relatively small at 0.048
patient days. Finally, the analysis found no statistically significant ATE for the total
gross charges, indicating statistically similar medical care intensities on both DNR and
non-DNR patients.
Of further interest is the ATT, as whether or not the Do-Not-Resuscitate order
affects the health and healthcare outcomes of patients who have activated this advanced
directive has important policy ramifications. As demonstrated, those patients with a
DNR directive are shown to be 3.55% more likely to die while in the hospital due to
having an active DNR order. Further, consistent with previous literature discussed, the
length of stay is shortened by 0.273 patient days. However, once again, there is no
statistically significant ATT on gross charges due to the DNR order.
4.3 Sub-Samples
To further examine the effect stemming from active DNR orders, the dataset is
divided into sub-samples by ethnicity, gender, and type of insurance coverage. In Table
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3 below, we examine the ATT on white and non-white patients separately for
comparison.

Table 3: ATT and ATE by Ethnicity
Likelihood of
Death
White
ATT
4.18%*
Patients
ATE
3.50%*
Non-White
ATT
1.50%*
Patients
ATE
5.66%*
*1%, **5%,
***10%

Length of Stay

Gross Charges

-0.180*

-$213.50

0.025*
-0.338*

$3630.45
-$389.58

-0.129*

$4831.51

As illustrated, there is a statistically significant ATE on both the likelihood of
death and length of stay in the hospital for both white and non-white patients. There is a
significantly larger increase in the likelihood of death for non-white patients relative to
white patients, as the rise in probability is 5.66% to 3.50%, respectively. Also, we see
opposing statistically significant effects on the length of stay. Non-white patients see a
ATE of a decrease of 0.129 patient days, while white patients see an increase of 0.025
patient days. Though, there is no statistically significant ATE on total gross charges for
either white or non-white patients.
Contrary to the ATE, the ATT from a DNR order on the likelihood of death
within the hospital is an increase of 4.18% for white patients who possess a DNR, but
only 1.50% for non-white patients. However, while the ATT on the length of stay while
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in the hospital is a decrease of 0.18 patient days for white patients, the ATT is a decrease
of 0.338 for non-white patients, suggesting that the likelihood of death for DNR patients
is not necessarily an indicator of length of stay. Finally, as before, that total gross
charges are not significantly affected by the treatment of a DNR.

Table 4: ATT and ATE by Gender

Male
Patients
Female
Patients

Length of Stay

Gross Charges

ATT

Likelihood of
Death
4.00%*

-0. 367*

-$837.29

ATE
ATT

3.28%*
3.42%*

0. 018*
-0. 180*

$3089.09
$1436.76*

ATE

2.67%*

0. 025*

$9743.20*

*1%, **5%,
***10%

In Table 4 above, the ATE, analyzed for gender sub-samples, for both the
likelihood of death and the length of stay for both male and female patients is statistically
significant. For male patients, there is an increase of 3.28% in the mortality measure,
while also an increase of 0.018 patient days. In the female patient sub-sample, there is an
increase of 2.67% for the mortality measure, while an increase of 0.025 for the length of
stay. Moreover, while not significant for male patients, there is a statistically significant
ATE on total gross charges for female patients, specifically an increase of $9,743.20.
This suggests that female patients with a DNR possibly receive increased medical care
than female patients without a DNR.
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The ATT from DNR orders is analyzed on sub-samples by gender. As illustrated,
male patients with a DNR see an ATT on the likelihood of death of an increase of 4.00%,
compared to 3.42% for their female counterparts. Further, the length of stay is decreased
by 0.365 days for male patients, but only 0.180 for females. Interestingly, again, while
the DNR has no statistically significant effect on total gross charges for male patients,
female patients have a statistically significant ATT on total gross charges of an increase
of $1,436.76.

Table 5: ATT and ATE by Insurance
ATT and ATE by Insurance
Likelihood of
Length of Stay
Death
TennCare
ATT
1.37%**
0. 041
Patients
ATE
9.32%**
0. 663
Medicare
ATT
3.63%*
-0. 265*
Patients
ATE
2.54%*
-0. 290*
Commercial
ATT
4.81%*
-0. 301**
Patients
ATE
2.89%*
0. 687**
Uninsured
ATT
-1.05%
0. 209
Patients
ATE
1.93%
7.382
Other Ins
ATT
2.69%*
-0. 701*
Patients
ATE
3.41%*
0. 036*
*1%, **5%, ***10%

Gross Charges
$505.42
$12819.11
-$1076.61*
$2213.54*
-$837.29
$3089.09
$1092.22
$43183.50
$652.85
$11518.78

Lastly, in Table 5 above, the ATT and ATE are illustrated for sub-samples by type of
insurance coverage. The DNR order has the largest ATT on the likelihood of death for
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commercially insured patients, as it increases the probability by 4.81%, while having the
largest ATE for TennCare patients by increasing the probability by 9.32%. Also, the
ATT and ATE on the likelihood of death is not statistically significant for uninsured
patients, even though they are more likely to have a DNR order than insured patients.
Further, there was no statistically significant ATT or ATE on the length of stay for
TennCare and uninsured patients. Notably, though, the ATT and ATE on total gross
charges was statistically significant for Medicare patients. Specifically, the ATT on DNR
patients covered by Medicare was a decrease of $1,076.61 in total gross charges, while
the ATE was an increase of $2213.54. This represents a possible indication of difference
in healthcare provision to those patients.
5.1 Conclusions
Using a comprehensive patient discharge dataset for all hospitals in the state of
Tennessee for 2008, the authors examine the ATT and ATE of DNR orders on the
likelihood of death, length of stay while in the hospital, and total gross charges as a
measure of medical care delivered to the patient. The ATT and ATE on the likelihood of
death are both over 3.5%, decrease the length of stay in the hospital by 0.273 patient
days, and are not statistically significant with regards to total gross charges for the entire
sample. The dataset is then divided into sub-samples to examine the potential effects
within specific patient groups. The ATT on likelihood of death is greater for white
patients, though the ATE is greater for non-white patients. Also, while uninsured patients
are more likely to have a DNR order than insured patients, we found no statistically
significant ATT or ATE on the measured health outcomes for uninsured patients.
Finally, while there was no statistically significant ATT or ATE on total gross charges for
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the entire sample, and most sub-samples, there were statistically significant effects on
female patients and Medicare patients. This suggests that those patients possibly receive
different intensities of medical care while in the hospital due to the DNR directive.
Further research is needed in the analysis of Do-Not-Resuscitate orders to account
for potential differences across states, as this study examines only in-state resident
patients for the state of Tennessee. Additionally, while total gross charges is used as a
measure of medical care delivered, more investigation is needed to examine the
underlying differences with regards to healthcare provision for DNR patients. Continued
expansion of awareness of the cause and effect of Do-Not-Resuscitate orders may greatly
aid in the provision of healthcare and health awareness.
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DISSERTATION CONCLUSIONS
In the five chapters presented, the fields of Health and Healthcare Economics
were incorporated with Applied Microeconomics examining, separately, the physical
therapy industry and the cause and effect of Do-Not-Resuscitate (DNR) orders. As
presented in the first chapter, the study of the U.S. physical therapy healthcare industry is
unique, innovative and timely in its application of the flexible translog dual cost
methodology to model operational efficiency using a bi-weekly comprehensive panel
dataset of physical therapy clinics (over 19,000 observations) with multiple operations
across 28 of the 50 US states for the 2008-2009 period. First, it is possible to infer the
production technology characteristics in US physical therapy care using a well-behaved
dual translog cost form. Second, the implied underlying production technology structure
is non-homothetic, which means that the cost function cannot be written as a separable
function in output and factor prices. Non-homotheticity implying nonlinear expansion
paths suggests that physical therapy clinic management should optimally re-organize
input factor ratios as output expands. Third, the US physical therapy cost function is
non-homogeneous in output since the elasticity of cost with respect to output is nonconstant. Fourth, data on physical therapy operations are inconsistent with the postulate
of unitary elasticities of substitutions technology. Using the preferred Morishima
substitution elasticity estimates as a measure of input factor relationships, the physical
therapy assistants tend to be a hybrid worker. They may be used as a substitute for the
non-clinical administrative personnel, but are complementary with the physical therapist
as they may contribute directly to increased output within the clinic at a significantly
lower cost. Fifth, while physical therapy cost increases in output, it does so at a
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decreasing rate. Finally, that production characterized by positive scale economies at the
mean number of patient visits (output level), as well as the 25% and 75% production
levels, suggests that the output expansion at the typical physical therapy clinic would tend
to be cost saving, all else given.
The study presented in the second chapter, expanding beyond results provided in
the first chapter, provides the first evaluation of the quality-adjusted production cost
structure of physical therapy health care while controlling for pediatric care clinics and,
continuing, the derived input factor relationships. The results present a well-behaved cost
function, and support the more flexible GTL production cost specification over the
alternative restricted production specifications. Thus, practitioners would be best served
to re-allocate utilization of labor types as output expands. Contrary to the previous study,
the new models presented that adjust output to reflect quality demonstrate costs increase
at an increasing rate with an increase in production. Additionally, the statistically
significant coefficient estimates for pediatric physical therapy care suggests a differing
cost structure from adult care centers. Finally, economies of scale are presented at the
75%, 50%, and 25% quartiles, indicating positive, yet diminishing in size, scale
economies. Further evaluation is conducted to examine the policy implications of
alternate theoretical concepts of mean expansion points on these relationships, as each
provide differing inferences regarding production technology. As demonstrated, the
choice of expansion point carries significant weight in the inferred input factor
relationships. The findings indicate the arithmetic mean to be an inappropriate choice for
expansion point. Representing a “sum of parts” production mean, it is more appropriate
for use with restricted technology structures (such as the Leontief production model).
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From the estimates, we conclude that the results derived from the arithmetic model
misrepresent the pair-wise input factor relationships. It is clear, given the high statistical
significance of all the interaction terms, the elasticity measurements, and rejection of all
restricted models, that a more dynamic mean concept for the expansion point is in order.
However, with the varying nature of the quality-adjusted outputs across locations, in
addition to the exogenously determined output level, the harmonic mean also
misrepresented the substitutability/complementarity for input pairs, although it tends to
be closer to the estimates from the geometric mean model. Consequently, for the fitted
GTL cost model, the geometric mean expansion point is optimal. This finding stems from
statistically significant, dynamic interactions of the various labor groups with each other,
as well as with the output measure.
The research presented in the third chapter provides the first comparative analysis
of quality-adjusted production cost structure in pediatric versus adult physical therapy
health care, as well as insights into pair-wise input relationships and scale economies.
The study findings are from a well-behaved cost function, and support the fully flexible
GTL dual cost specification over a number of restricted production technologies.
Therefore, with increases in quality-adjusted output, physical therapy operations may
alter the input mix to minimize costs, as revealed by own- and cross-price, Morishima,
and shadow elasticities of demand and substitution measures. Also, economies of scale
estimates are presented signifying diminishing increases in cost with given increases in
quality-adjusted output. Finally, the pediatric clinic model results are compared with the
estimates derived for adult physical therapy production, and are found to be statistically
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different. Pediatric clinics are found to put a greater emphasis on the physical therapist in
the input mix, and operate with less scale economies than their adult counterparts.
Research into the decision making process of Do-Not-Resuscitate orders,
presented in the fourth chapter, using a comprehensive dataset provides a greater
understanding of such a pivotal decision-making process within an inpatient hospital
setting. Among the key findings of the study, it is shown that, consistent with previous
research, patient age has a positive impact on the likelihood of possessing an active DNR
order while in the hospital. Further, white patients are more likely than non-white
patients, though male patients, contrary to some previous studies, have a higher
probability of a DNR directive than females. Being uninsured has the most powerful
effect, all else equal. Additionally, the negative impact from median income levels on
DNR likelihood is most pronounced for uninsured patients. Finally, relative to non-profit
hospitals, patients within public hospitals are significantly less likely to have a DNR,
while those in for-profit facilities carry a greater probability.
Finally, using the same comprehensive patient discharge dataset for all hospitals
in the state of Tennessee for 2008, the fifth chapter examines the ATT and ATE of DNR
orders on the likelihood of death, length of stay while in the hospital, and total gross
charges as a measure of medical care delivered to the patient. The ATT and ATE on the
likelihood of death are both over 3.5%, decrease the length of stay in the hospital by
0.273 patient days, and are not statistically significant with regards to total gross charges
for the entire sample. The dataset is then divided into sub-samples to examine the
potential effects within specific patient groups. The ATT on likelihood of death is
greater for white patients, though the ATE is greater for non-white patients. Also, while
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uninsured patients are more likely to have a DNR order than insured patients, we found
no statistically significant ATT or ATE on the measured health outcomes for uninsured
patients. Finally, while there was no statistically significant ATT or ATE on total gross
charges for the entire sample, and most sub-samples, there were statistically significant
effects on female patients and Medicare patients. This suggests that those patients
possibly receive different intensities of medical care while in the hospital due to the DNR
directive.
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